Opening Remarks
of the Director of Central Intelligence
Conference on CIA's Analysis
of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991
Princeton University
March 2001
Princeton University's Center of
International Studies and CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence have
done a great job in organizing this Conference on the Agency's Cold War
Analysis of the Soviet Union. It is just the newest example of Princeton's
famous motto: "Princeton in the Nation's Service and in the Service of
All Nations." I have no doubt that these discussions will make an important
contribution to the understanding of intelligence analysis and of the role
it played in shaping policy during the defining conflict of the latter
half of the 20th century.
Back in 1997, CIA held its 50th anniversary
gala. Dick Helms, a legend in the world of espionage well before he ever
became Director of Central Intelligence, delivered the keynote address.
I had expected Dick to focus on the operational side, but he surprised
me by reminding everyone that analysis--putting all the information together,
evaluating it, and warning US policymakers of key elements in the international
environment--was in fact the CIA's original and central mission.
Of course, each Director of Central
Intelligence has his own perspective on analysis. William Colby, a Princeton
alumn, believed that, while a DCI must juggle many different things at
once, his responsibility for substantive intelligence is his most important
charge. A DCI should do his homework, discuss with his analysts the basis
of their assessments, then be prepared to brief--and defend--the Agency
or Intelligence Community views with precision and conviction before the
President--or perhaps even more daunting--the likes of a Henry Kissinger.
According to Colby, Kissinger had a voracious appetite for intelligence,
but he didn't necessarily believe it. "Bill," Kissinger would tell him,
"give me things that make me think."
Allen Dulles, the only other Princeton
graduate to become Director, had his own way of processing analysis. It
could be tough to brief him. There were always distractions and phone calls,
invariably ops-related. According to one war story, an analyst was ushered
into the inner sanctum. Dulles was watching a baseball game from a reclining
chair (for his gout, he said) placed directly in front of his TV. The analyst
stood facing him from behind the set. As the analyst pressed ahead with
his briefing, Dulles would remark "good fielder, can't hit" or something
like that, leaving the hapless briefer totally at a loss. Which is not
to say that Dulles was not listening--it was just hard to tell sometimes.
For example, when Khrushchev kicked out the anti-Party group in 1957, he
evidently took in what everyone said, then dictated his own briefing for
the President. By all accounts it was brilliant. He did not miss a single
nuance.
This conference coincides with the
release of over 850 CIA analytic documents on the Soviet Union, totaling
over 19,000 pages of text--all part of a larger effort begun by DCI Bob
Gates to illuminate the intelligence component of the Cold War's history.
This latest tranche of documents, combined with the approximately 2,700
CIA analytic products and National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR that
were previously declassified, constitutes the largest trove of intelligence
analysis on any single country ever released by any nation.
That achievement is significant,
but it is not sufficient. I am determined to make more of the analytic
record available. And so, the office that does most of our declassification
work will be releasing to scholars within the next couple of years a substantial
additional amount of CIA analysis on the Cold War and more National Intelligence
Estimates on the USSR.
Declassification is not easy. There
are no shortcuts. It takes experienced, knowledgeable people sitting down
with each document and painstakingly going over it page by page, line by
line. There is no alternative. A mistake can put a life in danger or jeopardize
a bilateral relationship integral to our country's security.
Despite the difficulties involved
in the declassification process, no other nation's foreign intelligence
agency has voluntarily released as much information about its past as has
the Central Intelligence Agency and we will continue to build upon that
achievement in the years ahead.
CIA will be as forward-leaning as
possible consistent with our security responsibilities. We will be forthcoming
for two major reasons: One--because US intelligence is a servant of America's
democratic system. We are accountable for our actions and the quality of
our work to elected leaders and ultimately to the American public. The
American people are best served by having available the information necessary
to understand how their government functions. And two--because the men
and women of US Intelligence are proud of the contributions they made to
defending the security of the Free World during the Cold War. We believe
that a careful study of our role in that great global struggle will show
that, time and again, US Intelligence provided American leaders with critical
information and insights that saved American lives and advanced our most
vital interests.
Keeping the Cold War from becoming
a hot one was the overriding goal of US Intelligence and American national
security policy for over four decades. An intelligence effort of such magnitude
and fraught with such great risk and uncertainty was bound to have its
flaws and failures, both operational and analytical. I believe, however,
that the overall record is one of impressive accomplishment.
I know that each of you here tonight
has arrived at this conference with deep expertise, unique experiences,
and strong opinions that should make for interesting discussions. This
is, of course, not the first time that we have sought the views of outside
specialists. For example, from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, CIA's
Office of National Estimates benefited from the counsel of its "Princeton
consultants"--a group of scholars who met at Princeton and exchanged ideas
with CIA's top analysts. Others in universities and think tanks, individuals
with family or other ties to Russia and Eastern Europe, diplomats, business
people, and others from many walks of life who were interested in and knowledgeable
about Soviet affairs helped our analysts greatly. Our products were enriched
by their inputs, but any errors that may be found in our products are entirely
our own.
We in US Intelligence never claimed
to have had a monopoly on wisdom regarding the Soviet Union. It always
pays to have a little humility on that score, particularly here on George
Kennan's stomping ground. In recent years, as you know, Ambassador Kennan
has warned American policymakers against (quote) "creating a Russia of
our own imagination to take the place of the one that did, alas, once exist,
but fortunately is no more." It was no less a challenge for America's scholarly,
diplomatic, military--and intelligence communities--throughout the Cold
War to understand the Soviet reality--so that our national leaders could
base their decisions not just on fears, but on facts.
Analyzing the Soviet Union was anything
but an exact science for all of our communities, and dealing effectively
with Moscow was every Cold War President's ultimate leadership test. Among
the first to admit the difficulties for Cold War analysts and policymakers
alike was George Kennan's good friend, fellow Soviet expert and "Wise
Man," Chip Bohlen. Bohlen said (quote):
"There are two statements which indicate beyond doubt that the person making
them is either a liar or a fool. The first is: Whiskey has no effect on
my judgment. The other is: I know how to deal with the Russians.
Bohlen's statement holds just as
true today.
Assessing CIA's Analytic Contributions
To the men and women of the CIA's Analytic
Directorate--the Directorate of Intelligence--their Cold War mission was
very clear: to use all sources at their disposal to gauge the capabilities
and intentions of the massive, closed, totalitarian system that was the
Soviet Union, and by so doing, to provide the President and other US policymakers
with the information and insights they needed to act and plan with confidence.
Allow me to give you only a few examples
of the ways CIA analysis informed US decision making toward Moscow. I will
draw from a sampling of the Agency products that were released for this
conference, but in so doing I do not in any way wish to ignore the substantial
analytic contributions of CIA's companion agencies in the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, the armed services, and other parts of
the federal government. Of course, intelligence analysts were not the only
ones working on the Soviet puzzle. It should be interesting at this conference
to explore how our assessments measured up to contemporaneous judgments
from other quarters. And, as the former policymakers in the audience will
attest, many other factors besides intelligence reports and judgments shaped
their thinking and actions.
Those caveats aside, what does the
record show?
From the mid-1960s on to the Soviet
collapse, we knew roughly how many combat aircraft or warheads the Soviets
had, and where. But why did they need that many or that kind? What did
they plan to do with them? To this day, Intelligence is always much better
at counting heads than divining what is going on inside them. That is,
we are very good at gauging the size and location of militaries and weaponry.
But for obvious reasons, we can never be as good at figuring out what leaders
will do with them. In regard to the "unmeasurables," CIA analysts were
keenly aware of the importance of what they would conclude and of the political
pressures attendant to the issues on which their judgments were sought.
And for a quarter of a century, our national leaders made strategic decisions
with confidence in our analysts' knowledge of the Soviets' military strength.
The record shows that confidence was justified.
In the early--and mid--1980s, for
example, a radar under construction in Krasnoyarsk generated considerable
debate in Washington. The Intelligence Community's analysts were at center
stage, providing policymakers with their assessment of the radar's true
purpose. As it turns out, the Community assessment was on the mark. The
analysts maintained-- correctly--that the station was to be used primarily
for tracking ballistic missiles, not space tracking as the Soviets had
claimed. This analysis served as the basis for the Reagan Administration's
policy, which was to declare the radar a clear violation of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile treaty and to call for its dismantling.
Intelligence analysts perform a critical
service when they help policymakers think through complex issues, identify
possible strategies, and project likely outcomes. A case in point is the
role CIA played in assessing the potential implications for the United
States vis-a-vis Moscow of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.
Our Office of Soviet Analysis, or SOVA, forecast in late 1987 that Moscow
could not effectively counter SDI without severely straining the Soviet
economy, discounting Moscow's assertions that it could do so quickly and
cheaply. SOVA maintained that anything more than a modest acceleration
of existing offensive and defensive strategic deployments would divert
advanced technologies desperately needed to modernize the civilian economy.
Indeed, SOVA predicted that Moscow would defer key decisions on deployments
and "continue to pursue arms control measures to gain American concessions
on SDI." And so it did.
Leadership analysis remains perhaps
the most difficult of analytic specialties. Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to
power in the Soviet Union--assessing his evolving thinking and policies,
their implications and the chances for their success--posed huge analytical
dilemmas. One of the first papers done in the Gorbachev era was devoted
to the promises, potentials, and pitfalls of his economic agenda. Published
in the fall of 1985, it expressed doubt that the economic reforms that
Gorbachev had announced would actually be carried out, or that resources
could be found to meet his modernization goals. Two years later our analysts
were even more doubtful that he would succeed. They predicted that the
radical reforms that Gorbachev might be tempted to implement risked "confusion,
economic disruption, and worker discontent" that could embolden potential
rivals to his power.
It is tough to divine leadership
intentions in a secretive, centrally controlled society-- particularly
if that leadership, as was true under Gorbachev, ceases to be static. Assessing
thinking beyond the leadership--identifying other societal forces at work
and weighing their impacts, is even tougher. Take nationalist and ethnic
pressures, for example. For decades, Moscow's policies toward minorities
had combined gradual modernization with rigid suppression of any hints
of separatism. CIA's analysis reported that this long-standing combination
of concessions and coercion had kept a lid on a "potentially explosive
source of political instability." Our analysts picked up, however, on signs
of change in Soviet policy and rising ethnic tensions under Gorbachev and
drew the attention of US decision makers to their far-reaching implications.
A Business Built on Uncertainty,
Analysis Based on Judgment
Obviously our record was not perfect.
Intelligence analysis--even the most rigorous --can never be error-free.
Our analysts may have the best information available, but they seldom have
the luxury of complete information before making a judgment. The glints
and glimmerings of insight that they get from examining shards of information
help them peer into the unknown. But getting some forecasts wrong is an
unavoidable part of the intelligence business--a business built on uncertainty.
Although we could fairly accurately
count how many they already had, projecting the future development of Soviet
military forces, for instance, proved to be one of the most difficult problems
for the Intelligence Community during the Cold War. Every National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) written on the subject from 1974 to 1986, to which CIA analysts
contributed, overestimated the rate at which Moscow would modernize its
strategic forces.
But there is an important difference
between getting it wrong despite thoughtful analysis, and deliberately
exaggerating the threat. I think that an honest review of the documents
shows that our analysts made a good-faith effort. I would also note that,
in many cases, the very same analytic teams that overestimated future Soviet
procurement also published volumes of analysis about existing Soviet nuclear
missiles and warheads and other weapons programs that Moscow very much
wanted to keep secret. It was their painstaking analysis that gave successive
American Presidents and Senators the confidence to pursue, sign and ratify
arms control agreements--agreements that helped contain and mitigate the
very real dangers of the Cold War.
The fact that some of our analysis
became controversial--and remains the subject of heated disagreement today--does
not
necessarily mean that the judgments were wrong. The Agency's work in assessing
the state of the Soviet economy, for example, has come under criticism
since the Soviet collapse. This topic will be debated at the conference,
and that is all to the good. I will only note that it is all but forgotten--and
the declassified studies are there to remind us--that CIA analysts reported
a deceleration in Soviet economic growth as early as 1963. President Lyndon
Johnson thought this analysis so important that he dispatched a delegation
to brief the findings in West European capitals. American academics and
the national press, however, were skeptical of CIA's analysis. Indeed,
many economists of that era believed that the Soviet Union's command economy
possessed inherent advantages over the market-based systems of the West.
But whatever the prevailing currents of popular thinking may be, it is
the responsibility of our analysts to call it like they see it, whether
the evidence supports the conventional view or not.
We can even point to an instance
where CIA analysts helped to shape not only US policy, but even may have
helped to shape Soviet policy as well. We now know that the Kremlin monitored
economic studies done in the West on the Soviet Union, especially CIA reports
published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. President Jimmy
Carter drew particular attention to such a CIA study when he declared to
a surprised world that the Soviet petroleum industry was beset by serious
problems. The Agency had projected that Soviet oil production was likely
to plateau by the early 1980s and then decline to the point where the USSR
would become a net importer of oil. As it turned out, CIA was right on
the fundamental problems that eventually brought about a fall in production.
But our analysts underestimated the Soviets' ability to avert the worst
by shifting investment in favor of the energy sector and changing the USSR's
extraction and exploration policies--changes that perhaps resulted from
Moscow's reading of the Agency's published assessment. And those changes
have real implications for Russian energy production today.
US Intelligence capabilities clearly
were not omniscient during the Cold War, and we are not all-seeing now.
Our Soviet analysts were not prescient then and our Russia analysts are
not all-knowing today. Our analysts continue to work in a climate that
President Kennedy described in his day when he said that intelligence successes
are often unnoticed while our failures are paraded in public.
And that is fine. Our analysts are
not in this business for headlines or kudos. They are in it to make a critical
difference--to advance our nation's interests and values. And that is what
they do every single day. I make it a point to remind them that the fear
of sometimes getting it wrong should never, ever get in the way of them
doing their job. And when my analysts do call it wrong, they take responsibility
and they learn from their mistakes. That means taking apart the evidence
or the assumptions that got them off track. It can be a painful process,
but it makes for better analysis.
What, then, if not infallibility,
should our national leaders, and ultimately the American public, expect
of our analysts?
First and foremost, they should
expect our analysts to deliver intelligence that is objective, pulls no
punches, and is free from political taint.
Next, that our analysts think creatively,
constantly challenging the conventional wisdom, and tapping expertise wherever
it lies--inside the Intelligence Community or in the private sector and
academia.
That our analysts always act with
the highest standards of professionalism.
That they take risks--analytic risks--and
make the tough calls when it would be easier to waffle.
That they respond to the President's
and other decision makers' needs on demand-- juggling analytic priorities
and capabilities to meet the most urgent missions.
And lastly, that our analysis not
only tell policymakers about what is uppermost on their minds--but also
alert them to things that have not yet reached their in-boxes.
Making a Critical Difference, Then
and Now
In closing, I will only say that more
that a decade after the Soviet Union's demise, we live in a world still
in transition from something that was well understood--the bipolarity of
the Cold War--to something that has yet to crystallize. In such a world,
our country needs a strong analytic intelligence capability more than ever
to help the President separate fact from fiction, avoid danger, seize opportunities,
and steer a safe course to the future.
On behalf of CIA's analytic community,
I want to thank you for your participation and interest in this conference
and in our work--past, present and future. As always, we welcome and value
your insights, and we hope that you will find the discussions stimulating.
Remarks of the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Conference on CIA's Analysis
of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991
Princeton University
March 2001
When the conference organizers asked
me to give its first keynote address, I reminded them that my principal
work on this part of the world came after the Soviet Union had broken up.
In fact, it was just three months after that breakup that I was put in
charge of the Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis--the name we gave
to the organization that picked up the responsibility for analysis of the
former Soviet Union, once it had ceased to exist. Because I had the opportunity
to lead our work on this part of the world at that pivotal moment, I thought
that is what I ought to talk about rather than looking back at our effort
on the Soviet Union. You are going to be doing that non-stop for a day
and a half, so perhaps you will welcome a brief excursion into the decade
that just passed into history.
This topic is germane to the conference
for a number of reasons. First, what I encountered back in March of 1992
was in every way the inheritance of our long focus on the Soviet target.
And the experiences we had in those early post-Soviet years were emblematic
of the Agency's efforts, successful I believe, to adjust to a new world
that no longer had a universally accepted organizing principle for American
intelligence.
So let me take you back to the spring
of 1992 and tell you something about the journey we have been on since
then. Let me begin with an anecdote that I believe says a lot. On my first
day on the job in 1992, I made the rounds, shaking hands with my new colleagues.
I remember stopping by one officer's cubicle, and there, sitting on top
of her computer, instead of the usual souvenirs, was a big can of peas
with Cyrillic lettering. When I asked why, she replied: "I'm the canned
goods analyst." We also had a timber analyst back in those days.
To me, that anecdote says volumes
about Soviet analysis during the Cold War. For reasons that this audience
will readily grasp, it was actually important that we understand things
like the food processing industry--symbolized by that can of peas--in order
to gauge the underlying strength of Soviet society. As you know, we tried
every conceivable way to gain insights into that fundamentally closed system--a
system whose functioning was opaque in the most basic respects, not only
to the rest of the world, but to its own people--even to its leadership,
as Vlad Treml will attest tomorrow. Sherman Kent, the founding father of
national intelligence estimates, once said: "Estimating is what you do
when you do not know." We did a lot of estimating during the Cold War,
and we are doing a lot of estimating now. But what we didn't know then
about the Soviet Union is different in so many ways from what we don't
know now about Russia. Most of what we needed to know then was at least
discoverable. Much of what we'd like to know now may not even be knowable.
Today, our Office of Russian and
European Analysis does not employ a canned goods analyst, or even a timber
specialist. The Russia that our analysts are trying to understand is no
longer cloaked from view by a totalitarian regime. But in many ways I think
it is even harder to grasp--by us and by the Russians themselves.
It was not always this way. Dick
Lehman, the creator of what we now call the President's Daily Brief, once
remarked that the basic analytic training he got back in 1949 came down
to a single piece of advice from his boss: "Whatever you do, just remember
one thing--the Soviet Union is up to no good!" Simple, but that said it.
To be sure, there were other targets, but as someone who worked on many
of them, I can tell you that our interest was mostly derivative. For something
to gain priority attention or command resources, there had to be a connection
to the Soviet threat.
Many CIA analysts cut their baby
teeth in SOVA--the legendary Office of Soviet Analysis--or in one of the
celebrated offices that preceded SOVA's creation in 1981. And young analysts
soon learned that the ultimate objective of their collective efforts--whether
their expertise lay in peas or trees or tanks--came down to helping us
gauge the Soviets' military strength and intentions. Everybody understood
the paradigm. Everybody knew what the top analytic priorities were: the
frontal threat to NATO, Moscow's first strike capabilities, the Soviet
command and control system, arms control monitoring, the capacity of the
Soviet economy to sustain military power. As many of you will recall vividly,
the butter-guns question of how many dishwashers equals a tank was a serious
analytic calculation--also I might add, a difficult proposition from a
collection standpoint, considering that Soviet dishwashers actually looked
like tanks.
With the demise of the Soviet Union,
the nature of our analytic questions changed. Before, threats emanated
from Soviet strengths. Now, dangers stemmed largely from Russia's weaknesses
or simply from the uncertainties associated with its transformation. Now,
we were not so much concerned about a deliberate, surprise attack by Moscow
or the sheer numbers of military forces and equipment. Instead, we worried
about instability in 15 sovereign states instead of one, about the cohesiveness
of Russia itself, about whether it was reconciled to the independence of
the other fourteen states, about the safety and security of weapons, about
proliferation fueled by Russia's economic straits, and about how to maintain
momentum in arms control when your original partner no longer existed.
And this was a time of wrenching
change for our analysts. Economists who had worked their entire professional
lives on a command economy were suddenly confronted with free prices and
privatization. And it was not enough just to apply the tried-and-true lessons
of macro-economic and micro-economic theory, for this was an economic transition
unlike any that preceded it. We quickly discovered that no one had the
market cornered on analyzing such a thing, and we had to actually devise
from scratch methodologies to do things like gauge the size of the private
sector.
Our political analysts, meanwhile,
had to plunge into real electoral politics while our military analysts,
sharply reduced in numbers, could stop worrying about the cost of Soviet
defense while they refocused on more qualitative questions such as whether
the military would play a stabilizing role in the new Russia. For their
part, the canned goods and timber specialists were retooling in Uzbek language
class, brushing up on Ukrainian politics, or starting to focus in detail
on places like Chechnya.
While we were wrestling with these
challenges, outside the Intelligence Community, in the world of politics,
the pundits and the press, there was expectant talk of a "Peace Dividend."
The "End of History" had come--the last, great ideological conflict was
over. Skepticism was rife about the need for the US to sustain a global
presence--diplomatic, military and intelligence. There was talk of a US-Russian
strategic partnership and after a protracted post-Tiananmen policy rollercoaster,
Washington and Beijing were getting back on track. Osama bin Laden and
the missile threat hadn't made headlines--yet. Sanctions had put Saddam
in a straitjack. The world seemed like a much less dangerous place.
When DCI James Woolsey talked about
the proliferators, traffickers, terrorists, and rogue states as the serpents
that came in the wake of the slain Soviet dragon, he was accused of "creating
threats" to justify an inflated intelligence budget.
As was the case with the State Department
and the Defense Community, the Intelligence Community was downsized. By
1995, CIA's analytic ranks had shrunk by 17 percent from what they
were in 1990. By the end of the 1990s, we were down by about 22 percent.
I reduced the office I headed by 42 percent in the space of three years.
Overall, our Russia effort decreased by 60%, as personnel were justifiably
shifted in the ways I've described and to non-Russian areas.
Well, almost a decade has gone by
since the Soviet collapse and even though there still is no organizing
principle that pulls our priorities into an alignment comparable to the
Soviet period, there is no shortage of work for the Intelligence Community.
If anything, the list of issues the Director must discuss in the threat
assessment he delivers annually to Congress grows longer and more complex
each year. Those thirsting for the clarity of the Soviet period may have
to live with the likelihood that what we see is what we may continue to
get for a long time: a kaleidoscopic world of rapidly shifting, interconnected
problems--the kind of world that presents the toughest challenge to an
analyst trying to help decisionmakers minimize the risk of strategic surprise.
The future-ologist Peter Schwartz
believes that we have entered an era of what he calls "fundamental discontinuity"
which will go on indefinitely due to globalization and the accelerating
speed of technological innovation. I think he is right. Maybe because our
analysts are used to thinking in geopolitical terms and five to ten years
out, they tend to refer to this post-Cold War period as a "strategic pause"--or
what Paul Kennedy might call the gap between "strategic epochs." Policymakers
used to worry about a missile gap--until our reconnaissance and imagery
pioneers proved it didn't exist. Now, it's an "epoch gap," but I'm not
so sure we can help with that.
My point is that after any great
upheaval--in this case the Soviet collapse--there has usually been a period
of confusion, uncertainty, and turbulence while the world sorts itself
out.
Think back on the last time empires
disintegrated on anything like the scale we witnessed when the Soviet Union
came apart and imagine the challenge it presents to our intelligence analysts.
For example, if we had had a US
Intelligence Community when the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires collapsed
after World War I, could it have predicted the enormity of what came next:
the rise of Hitler, the Holocaust, Stalin's purges, World War II, the atomic
bomb, the Cold War?
Just as there was high potential for
surprise in that period of transition, I believe that our nation has entered
an era when the potential for unwelcome surprise is greater than at any
time since the end of the Second World War. There are a number of reasons
for this:
As we have seen in places as diverse
as the Balkans, East Timor, and the Congo, the crumbling of Cold War constraints
and the surge of globalization have unleashed forces that rapidly spill-over
into open violence that can engulf entire regions.
Second, the revolution in technology
enables, drives, or magnifies dangers to us. DCI Gates has said that after
the 1960s, the US was never surprised by a Soviet weapons system. We cannot
be as confident today that we know about our adversaries' capabilities,
because paradigm-busting advances are occurring simultaneously in so many
scientific and technical fields. As we point out in our report on the world
in 2015, in science and technology, the time between discovery and application
is shrinking every year.
Third, the advanced technologies
that once were the preserve of the superpowers have passed into other hands.
Access to advanced technology gives hostile states and non-state actors
new shields and new swords. Greater power and longer reach. In today's
networked world, they have easier access to information, finances, deception-and-denial
techniques, and to each other. And the perception of America's so-called
"hegemony" has itself become a lightning rod for the disaffected. Related
to all of this, America's sole superpower status has created a global climate
conducive to what I would call "experimental alliances," as various aspiring
powers search for common cause, usually with the aim of off-setting American
preeminence.
Fourth, the American public--for
the first time--has to face the fact that the territorial United States--our
power grids, our water and transportation systems, and our public communications
networks are vulnerable to new and unconventional dangers like chemical
and biological weapons and cyber attacks, and also to some older conventional
threats like ballistic missiles.
Last but not least, Russia and China
and other key countries in volatile regions--Iran, and the Korean peninsula--are
undergoing political, economic, demographic and strategic transitions whose
outcomes could have widely varying national security consequences for the
United States.
From the perspective of an intelligence
officer, it seems that America's next move these days must always be calculated
on a three dimensional chess board.
Given such a world, I tell our analysts
that I do not belong to the Peter Schwartz School of "fundamental discontinuity"
or the Paul Kennedy School of "epochal gaps." I belong to the Monty Python
School of "Now for Something Completely Different." I am conscious every
day of how important it is for our analysts to challenge the conventional
wisdom, to separate what we really know from what we merely think, to consider
alternative outcomes--in short, to not fall victim to mindset, overconfidence,
or anyone's pet paradigm. Our country and its interests are at their most
vulnerable if its intelligence professionals are not always ready for "something
completely different."
On that score, today's Russia seldom
fails to disappoint. Our Russia analysts would be the first to admit that
at times they have had to struggle hard to anticipate what is coming next.
But they have found some consolation in the thought that Yeltsin and Putin
have probably felt the same way.
That said, I think when someday we
have a conference about this latest decade, our analytic record on Russia
will stand up well. Among the things I think it will show:
We got an early grip on the newly
independent states and their likely evolution along different paths. In
March of 1991--nine months before the Soviet breakup--a new division was
created in SOVA to devote more attention to the republics.
Our analysts anticipated the violent
crisis in the fall of 1993, when Yeltsin dissolved the communist-dominated
Supreme Soviet to break the constitutional gridlock that paralyzed the
country.
In 1994, we warned of the first Chechen
War.
We were forward-leaning on the outcome
of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000,
and we published and briefed extensively on corruption and the rise of
Russian organized crime, long before it became such a prominent issue.
In the economic sphere, we warned
policy makers of the looming economic crisis two months before the August
1998 ruble crash and called the rebound in the economy long before business
and academic experts did.
And we were frequently able to stay
ahead of the curve in anticipation of Yeltsin's frequent government shake-ups.
On the things that can inflict harm
on Americans or America's vital interests or those of our allies--such
as loose nukes, proliferation and efforts to stymie NATO enlargement--we
didn't know everything, but we put together a pretty good picture because
we had a strong factual base from which to speculate.
But there were many "softer" issues--subjects
which don't lend themselves to measurement--that were more difficult for
us to assess with high levels of specificity. Putin's meteoric rise to
the presidency is a case in point. When he was plucked from obscurity to
become Premier, we would not have told you with confidence that he would
rise to the Presidency--until his handling of the Chechen war dramatically
increased his popularity. But in early 1999, Putin probably did not foresee
this either. On such "unmeasurables," analysts must operate with greater
degrees of uncertainty--they must work in the realm not just of the unknown,
but of the unknowable.
What is knowable is that Russia's
efforts to find its identity at home and its place in the world cannot
be divorced from larger 21st century realities--the realities of a world
in which countries globalize or get left behind, where national strength
is measured not just in a military's access to hardware but in civilians'
access to software--an increasingly borderless world of hope and hazard
and unremitting change--realities which all countries confront, including
our own.
Just like their targets, to be successful
in this new century, our intelligence analysts must adapt. US Intelligence
must find new ways of doing its analytic business. And that is exactly
what we are doing. Let me briefly describe some of the steps we are taking:
First, we have repositioned institutionally
to meet the changing nature of the threats. Today we devote only a fraction
of the effort we once did to Russia. In the old days, SOVA was the largest
office in the Directorate of Intelligence; today, given the cross-border
nature of many current and emerging threats, that distinction goes to the
Office of Transnational Issues.
We also have channeled substantial
analytic resources to specialized centers staffed by experts from across
the Intelligence Community to deal with Nonproliferation and Crime and
Narcotics issues.
And, as the National Intelligence
Council's 2015 report demonstrates, we are paying increasing attention
to non-traditional areas such as demographics, disease and water scarcity
while continuing to chart trends in energy, economic development, and weaponry.
We are spending more time on how these factors inter-connect and on how
they affect security and stability.
Next, we have placed a high priority
on getting our analysts the technical tools they need to deal with the
growing problems of volume and speed. Information increases by about a
million documents per day, and that's just on the web. Five years from
now, our all-source analysts will have to deal with ten times the amount
of information that they now receive from open sources and clandestine
collection. One analyst recently told me that the way she does her job
has changed more in one year than in the preceding nine due to her desk
top links with the Internet and classified intelligence networks. Today,
providing vital "value added" analysis to consumers sometimes depends as
much on our analysts' ability to pluck key information out of the flood
and move it quickly as it does on the analysis itself. Information-mining
technologies and connectivity among our analysts within CIA, across the
Intelligence Community and with our customers will help us stay ahead of
the competition--I don't mean our commercial competitors, but the hostile
actors who can-- and will--exploit what is commercially available.
But being smart about how we configure
ourselves, allocate resources and use technologies will not be enough.
As Sherman Kent put it decades ago: "There is no substitute for the intellectually
competent human--the person who was born with the makings of critical sense
and who has developed them…through firsthand experience and study."
With that in mind, we have over the
last several years begun very aggressively to strengthen our analytical
ranks that were so dangerously thinned after the Cold War. CIA, for example,
is engaged in the largest across-the-board recruiting drive in a decade,
and we are bringing in first-rate talent. We have established a new Sherman
Kent School for Intelligence Analysis to intensively train the new recruits.
Beyond increasing our bench strength against key targets, we are going
all out to achieve greater analytic depth. We are providing incentives
for analysts to stay on their accounts longer. We are affording our analysts
greater opportunities to travel and to broaden their experience. Because
we claim no monopoly on wisdom, we are bringing in outside experts for
short tours as scholars-in-residence. We also are encouraging our analysts
to expand their contacts with specialists elsewhere in government, in the
private sector and in academia.
Our objective is a vigorous, creative,
agile analytic capability that is equal to 21st century challenges and
second to none.
I will close my comments on all that
has changed in the analysis business by talking about what hasn't changed
at all. I've mentioned Sherman Kent frequently, and let me say that today's
analysts have the same three wishes that he used to talk about in his day:
"To know everything. To be believed. And to exercise a positive influence
on policy."
Of course, today's analysts don't
know everything--that's why they still call 'em estimates. And they realize,
as did their predecessors, that they won't always be believed, in spite
of the rigor of their analysis. As to whether our analysts have a meaningful
influence on policy, we will soon hear from former decision makers on that
score. As for the decade I've just discussed, I can tell you that if the
volume of questions we answer is any indication, our analysts have been
very influential indeed. I am very proud of what they've accomplished.
Thank you. I would be happy to hear
your thoughts and take your questions.
Address by Former
DCI
Conference on CIA's Analysis
of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991
Princeton University
March 2001
James R. Schlesinger
|
Dr. Schlesinger was introduced by
Fred Hitz.
When Fred asked me to speak this
evening he posed two questions: How well did the intelligence community
do? Which reminds me of the standard jokes of Henny Youngman, who
said, "How's your wife?" "Compared to what?" And the second
question was: How influential was the reporting of the Intelligence Community
with intelligence makers and was that intelligence properly utilized?
Let me start with the second question,
which is, how influential was intelligence with policymakers? The
basic issue is, who is influencing whom. Intelligence can be very
influential when it is leaked to the press, influencing public perceptions
or Congressional opinions, if not the policy makers themselves. That,
of course, occurred back in the late 1950's, and in the 1960 election in
particular, with the bomber gap issue and the missile gap issue.
I myself worked for President Nixon who was convinced that he lost the
1960 Presidential election because of the CIA and its influence over the
missile gap issue. I might add it later reduced his receptivity to
any commentary from the CIA when he became President.
Now it is not always the influence
of intelligence analysts on policy makers; sometimes it works the other
way around. All too frequently intelligence analysts become susceptible
to the policy convictions of the policy makers. Before I relate some
examples of this, let me make some initial observations. First, intelligence
is a tough business. It reminds one of Niels Bohr's comments that
predicting is very hard, especially about the future. This comment,
by the way, is often erroneously attributed to Samuel Goldwyn.
Second, intelligence officials do
not normally make political decisions. That's not always the case,
of course. Bill Casey, for example, had strong policy convictions
and expressed them especially with regard to Central America. DCI
Allen Dulles certainly played a large policymaking role in forging our
position with regard to Cuba. And right now George Tenet is out in
the Middle East, or was out in the Middle East, doing essentially a policy
job.
Let me stress that intelligence officers
can be at the mercy, I use that word carefully, of policymakers.
Policymakers may not always listen to what is being said, but they are
quite ready to blame their failures, or foul ups, on faulty intelligence.
Intelligence and the Intelligence Community are the handiest of all scapegoats.
Policymakers start with a set of presuppositions, or images of what the
world is like, and for the most part, the so-called failures, the major
failures of intelligence, reflect axioms in the minds of policymakers that
may trickle down to the Intelligence Community. I like to relate
the story of a CIA analyst who back in 1951 was studying the movements
of the Chinese and had reached the conclusion that the Chinese had surreptitiously
introduced their forces into North Korea, and he went around Washington
peddling this scenario, and he got to the office of the then- Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Dean Rusk. Rusk listened
very carefully and politely to the presentation, and at the end of it he
said, "Young man, they wouldn't dare." "They wouldn't dare" is frequently
in the minds of policymakers. And particularly, of course, a major
power that presupposes that others will not challenge it.
The classic example of this is not
an American example, but the 1973 war in the Middle East. The Israeli's
had absorbed the political axiom from their intelligence service that the
Arab States would never dare to attack them unless they had achieved air
superiority first. This analysis did not count on the Arab use of
surface-to-air missiles that neutralized, for a while, Israeli air superiority,
and thus the Israelis were surprised until the last tactical moment by
the decision of the Arab States to attack. The "They wouldn't dare,"
concept I think, also occurred at the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983.
And there was a large element of that thinking in the Tet Offensive in
Vietnam in 1968.
Let me touch on a third point.
Intelligence is not clairvoyance. Intelligence can and is pretty
good regarding routine developments. It's pretty good except when
you come to a turning point, and then it becomes iffy. The human
mind does not readily grasp fundamental change. Human beings find
it hard to grasp such change. Likewise organizations, which consist
of many human beings, and particularly large organizations, have to be
convinced that change is coming, or that they've reached a turning point.
It's a long process in large organizations that is reinforced by the "not
invented here" factor and the bureaucratic investment in existing interpretations,
structure, and organization.
Finally, one needs to remember that
it is the goofs that stick in your mind, the failings, not the successes.
It's the things that went wrong. I'll come back with some examples
to illustrate these points later on.
But to the first question that Fred
posed. How did we do? How did the Intelligence Community do
in that long period of the Cold War? This morning I asked my colleague
Brent Scowcroft, and he said, "Not too bad." High compliment.
"Not to bad, but we should have done better." And I think that pretty
well summarizes it. Do we expect, for example, baseball players to
achieve nearly a thousand percent as a batting average? The answer
is, of course, no. The press, the Congress, and most administrations,
however, tend to feel that intelligence should be 100 percent accurate.
To continue my baseball analogy, four hundred is a remarkable high batting
average that hasn't been achieved since Ted Williams. Yet, that is
only four hits in every ten times at bat.
Anyhow, back to trying to understand
the Soviet Union. We had substantial difficulties in our analysis.
First, Russia was a closed society. We also started at a low point
in terms of our knowledge and our attitudes toward the Soviet Union.
What saved us in my opinion was our adoption of technology. Not only
overhead reconnaissance, but SIGINT became valuable tools in the intelligence
game.
Earlier, there was a little tribute
to the absent chairman of the technology session, Bud Wheelon, so I'll
tell you a Bud Wheelon story. Back when I was in the Bureau of the
Budget and one of the satellite systems was up for discussion, Wheelon
was called to the executive office to justify the system. He began
to explain what the system would do in general terms, and he kept getting
more and more specific questions. Finally he became more and more
nervous and said, "I don't think that these things are supposed to be discussed
in the Executive Office of the President." He was very sensitive
to discussing the highly compartmented program. Those were the old
days, and I think things have changed since that time. But, he had
a fundamental truth there, as President John F. Kennedy said, "The ship
of state is the only one that leaks from the top."
Well, again how well did we do?
Go back to 1945 before the CIA existed. We started our analysis of
the Soviet Union, as I indicated, from a miserable base. Not only
in terms of information about the Soviet Union but in terms of the attitudes
that emerged from the Second World War, from the close of the Roosevelt
administration, and even the early days of Harry Truman. Some of
you might remember the "I like old Joe Stalin, but he is a prisoner of
the Politburo" type attitude that existed at the time. It was not
based upon very good intelligence analysis.
There were lots of misconceptions
in those days. The wartime euphoria of the allied partnership and
the hostility of the Soviet Union towards the West was not presupposed
are just a couple of these misconceptions. Expectations of possible
Soviet hostility toward the West were the province of military men, like
General George C. Patton, and reactionaries. Witness the now forgotten
discussions over the Bremen Enclave. The Bremen Enclave reflected
general US attitudes at the close of World War II that the real danger
in the post-war world would be Britain, and its imperialist tendencies.
A great deal of planning effort went into ensuring that the American forces
in Southern Germany would have access to the North Sea with this established
Bremen Enclave. We spent virtually no time worrying about allied
access to Berlin, since the Soviet Union was not presupposed to be the
danger in the post-war world. Once again, this was before the CIA
existed. It was only after the Soviet take-over of Eastern Europe,
the initiative of the Marshall Plan, which was rejected by the Soviet Union,
not only for itself but for its new satellites, and particularly the Czech
coup in 1948, that the views towards the Soviet Union universally hardened
in the United States.
As I stated previously, the Soviet
Union was a hard target for us. There were special problems, of course,
in collecting intelligence, especially in the early years before we had
the technological breakthroughs. I can remember early discussions
of Soviet factory production. We took estimates of factory floor
space, and made this leap of conviction about the production that could
be carried on in the Soviet Union. These projections, incidentally,
presupposed a much higher rate of productivity in the Soviet Union than
actually existed. It was this kind of analysis that led to the misleading
estimates of the bomber gap and then later the famous missile gap controversy.
We were saved, basically, by the technical collection revolution that was
discussed earlier today. Ultimately there was the downgrading of
the Soviet threat. Intelligence was no longer based upon speculation
about what the Soviet Union might be able to do, from which one leaps to
the conclusion that they had done it, to concrete observation about what
they were actually accomplishing.
After the technological breakthroughs
in intelligence collection and after the discovery that the Soviet Union
really was not pursuing as aggressive a policy as we had anticipated at
the close of the 1950's, and the beginning of the 1960's, there came the
new interpretation that the Soviets were merely reacting to the US positions.
This was strengthened after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Kennedy Administration's
belief that they had worked things out with the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.
After 1962 and 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara abandoned the
notion of counter-force directed against the Soviet Union and moved to
the concept of mutually assured destruction. Remember what I said
earlier about all too frequently intelligence is susceptible to the convictions
of policy makers. McNamara's conviction, and of course he was instrumental
in bringing CIA analysts into the center of strategic discussion, but McNamara's
convictions on arms control began to influence, and then to drive to a
considerable extent, national intelligence. That was true also of
his ideas on dИtente.
There was also a good deal of mirror
imaging of the Soviets in terms of, "They share the same ultimate goals
as we do." According to some, the Soviets only wanted to match the
United States, that was the cause of their rising arms build-up.
In fact, with regard to their ICBM forces, the prevailing belief in the
middle 1960's was that the Soviets only wanted to match us. Once
they had reached a thousand missiles, just as our Minuteman force was capped
at a thousand missiles, they would stop growing. When I joined the
Nixon administration in 1969, the Soviets had just gone through that thousand
limit and they showed no signs whatsoever of slowing down. As they
built up their forces there were still continuing echoes that the Soviets
were really only interested in matching us and that they would soon level
off and reduce their forces.
A similar view came into the Intelligence
Community, I say this with some care, with regard to dИtente. The
Soviets obviously shared our aspirations for dИtente. And I can well
recall August of 1968, at the time of the problems in Czechoslovakia, followed
by the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Russians and the Warsaw Pact countries.
I was that night at the home of Andy Marshall. We were working for
the Rand Corporation, and we had as a visitor, McNamara's chief man on
intelligence. As we listened to the radio reports of the invasion,
all he did was to wring his hands, "How could the Russians do this?"
He presupposed that Brezhnev felt about dИtente the way we did. He
obviously understood that this was going to damage dИtente, and he was
totally distressed. As I say this was not necessarily the view of
the entire CIA, but generally speaking, the view was widespread in the
Directorate of Intelligence. Nobody that I ever encountered took
that view in the Operations Directorate. Enough of that particular
period and those episodes.
I turn now to the other aspect that
I mentioned previously, the bureaucratic investment that is made in a particular
interpretation of history, or interpretation of current events, reinforced
by the "not invented here" phenomenon. And here I refer to the painful
progress, if I can put it that way, with regard to the economic data from
the Soviet Union. This data was gradually used to make an economic
model. One must remember that the output of such models is no better
than the input. Some years later I was serving with Warren Nutter,
down at the University of Virginia. He was doing a study for the
National Bureau of Standards. To say the least, he had some harsh
words for the CIA economic methodology, which I shared to some extent,
and which is reflected in a book that I wrote at the time. If you
believed the CIA estimates with regard to the Soviet economy and the
Soviet growth rate, the Soviets would
at some early point in the 1970's according to CIA estimates, exceed the
United States in total production. Mr. Khrushchev may have believed
it, by the way, when he said, "We shall bury you." It seems ridiculous
today.
Let me give another example on the
economic side of the estimates process. Doug MacEachin please forgive
me. This is a preemptive strike, I guess. Retaliation is certain,
isn't it? Anyway, when I became Director of Central Intelligence,
the estimate of Soviet military expenditures, in dollar terms, was about
equal to that of the United States, maybe four or five percent higher -
a point of view that I did not share. And one day, soon after I became
Director, I sat down with the analysts, and I said, "Here's the back of
an envelope, and let us go through what we are claiming." This didn't
come out of any complex economic model, it was just my thoughts on the
back of an envelope. I said the Soviets have nearly four million
men under arms, and we have just over two million. In dollar terms
what does that imply? It implies that the Soviets, excuse me, let
me add one other fact. The United States was spending about 50 percent
of its military budget on personnel, which in dollar terms would imply
that the Soviet Union was spending about the equivalent of our dollar expenditures
in the military budget simply on personnel. Right? They may
have had more enlisted people and draftees, but if you put them at US dollar
rates, they were spending about the same on personnel as we were.
Then we went over the list of procurement items in Russia, and they were
producing three thousand tanks a year, and we were producing two hundred
and forty or two hundred and fifty tanks a year or thereabouts. The
number of aircraft that they were producing vastly exceeded ours as well.
They weren't very good aircraft, at least they didn't have the same capabilities
as ours. In the final analysis, it was plain that the Russians were
spending about 50% of our military budget, in dollar terms, on procurement.
We gradually went through these expenditures. They had much lower
expenditures, of course, for operations, particularly in view of the fact
that we were still in Vietnam. But, nonetheless, the Soviet military
budget looked to be about 160% or 170% of what we were spending.
I think in the later years that that came to be confirmed.
Now the point of this is not that
there was an initial misjudgment on our part, the point is that there was
a major bureaucratic investment in that particular interpretation, because
I said to them, "Go away and clear up this problem." Then a few weeks
later I was summoned to go to the Department of Defense, and I was no longer
there to watch the changes that would come as a result of what I regarded
as very clear calculations. It took two and a half or three years
of study, as I recall it, supervised by Andy Marshall once again from the
Pentagon, before the adjustment in the estimates of Soviet military spending
came about. Bureaucracies have to go some place to hide their head
and all of that.
The point is that bureaucratic institutions,
and that includes the CIA, make investments in their calculations and it
is hard to get them to change their mind. That's especially true
when you have honest intellectuals. The services have much greater
flexibility. They seem to be able to adjust their views very quickly
once their perception of their interests change.
Fred also asked me to talk a bit
about the mid-period of the CIA, including Cuba and Vietnam. As for
Cuba at the time of the Bay of Pigs, the analysis was not very good.
I will say no more on that.
In Vietnam it was better than anybody
else's, by and large. It wasn't always that good but it was a lot
better, by and large, than what was coming out of the Department of Defense.
That was not always the case. We had the famous case of Sihanoukville
in Cambodia in which the Agency kept claiming that there was no evidence
that it was a major port of armament shipments to the VC. This debate
between the Pentagon and the Agency went on for a long time. Army
Intelligence was in the lead, and the position that it took was, "Look
. . . . .There's an awful lot being thrown at us, and its not coming down
the Ho Chi Min trail." And the answer to that from the CIA analysts
was, "You don't have any hard evidence for that, and until such time as
there is hard evidence. . ." The Army replied, "Look, when they unload
these munitions on us, that's hard evidence." The CIA was just plain
wrong. When Lon Nol took over in Cambodia and we got our hands on
the bills of lading, a flood of North Vietnamese munitions was going through
Sihanoukville, so the Agency was not always as good as one might think.
We had another example at the close
of the Vietnam War--this is not necessarily the view of Agency analysts
but the voice of the Agency as expressed by the DCI Bill Colby. Colby
was wedded to the belief of the salvation of South Vietnam, believed that
even though the ARVN had lost most of its best divisions, and even though
there was a retreat from I Corps and Second Corps, that a southern redoubt
could be formed in South Vietnam. Colby thought that the relics of
the ARVN could preserve Saigon and all ports, all parts South. His
believe was based upon hope, nothing more. It did not come from the
analysts at the CIA. It was Colby's personal belief.
Another example of this type of thinking
was Stansfield Turner's at the time of the overthrow of the Shah.
There was a great deal of skepticism amongst the analysts about the Shah's
future. I was then Secretary of Energy so I would have the analysts
come down from CIA and brief me. There was a great deal of skepticism
about what form of government would follow the Shah. Stan Turner,
however, had this belief that Khomeni was just another politician, and
he briefed it to the National Security Council that after the overthrow
of the Shah things would go pretty much as they had before, that they would
have to sell us oil and so forth. Now that is a defect in intelligence,
if not of the analysts at the CIA. Well, I've talked long enough.
Dr. Schlesinger also responded to
a final question from the audience: How do policy makers react to
intelligence? Schlesinger: The answer to that is, it varies.
George Bush, the elder, loved the intelligence product. This was
a part of his life. For Richard Nixon it was a different part of
his life, and the reaction was not nearly as good. Let me expand
the question to when do the intelligence analysts have their major impact
on an administration? Usually at the start of an administration before
its policy views begin to harden. As those policy views begin to
harden it takes greater and greater evidence to change anybody's mind.
It becomes a very hard sell. In fact it is almost impossible.
Policymakers--this may shock you--like to have their own views confirmed.
So they will pick over the intelligence to find the very items that support
those views. And so you have to have policymakers who are open minded,
and usually it is better to catch them early on in an administration.
Thank you very much.
Former National
Security Advisor's
Recollections and Recommendations
for CIA Conference on
CIA's Analysis of the Soviet
Union, 1947-1991
Princeton University
March 2001
Zbigniew Brzezinski
|
I have been interested in Soviet
affairs since I was a student. My graduate work was on Soviet affairs.
My undergraduate work dealt with Soviet affairs. And I have maintained
a sustained interest in that area, and in that topic, since then. For two
years, I served in the State Department, and I was an active consumer of
what many of you in this room, or your predecessors, were producing. For
four years, I served in the White House. And then I was, indeed, a very
active, voracious, consumer of what you had to produce. I was a privileged
consumer, not only of your finished products, but also of raw intelligence,
which I insisted on seeing, and to which I wanted to have direct access.
I would like to begin my comments
today by first of all saying, in all seriousness and sincerity, that I
have the highest regard for the personnel of the Agency. I've worked with
them over the years. In my private life I've also worked with them. There
was only one occasion when I refused to work with them, which was when
I was a young assistant professor at Harvard on my way to the Soviet Union
in the ‘50s, and I was visited by some representatives of the Agency who
wanted to task me with some assignments. And
I had, I think, the good common sense
to say to them, "I'm going as an academic. I'll keep my eyes and ears open.
I'll be happy to talk to you when I come back, and you can ask me whatever
you want to know, but I will not be tasked by you."
But there were other occasions where
I did cooperate, and I've never regretted it, because the people in the
Agency, I found over the years, were intensely able, energetic, and dedicated,
and they deserve truly high praise for their inventiveness, for their daring.
When I became a major consumer of the Agency's product for four years,
I must say I was immensely impressed by the innovativeness of some of the
techniques that the Agency developed for the acquisition of information.
Much of that has now become part of public knowledge; a great deal of it
has not. It all, cumulatively, testifies to the extraordinary ability to
innovate, to use science and technology for the purpose of obtaining a
more accurate understanding of what was then transpiring, and is now transpiring,
in areas of intense national security interest to the United States.
As a consumer, in retrospect, I have
to say that sometimes we, at the level at which I was working, did not
assist the Agency all that much in determining what would best help us.
We were not always clear about our needs; perhaps not often enough were
we engaged in very precise tasking of the Agency insofar as what would
best help us make the kinds of decisions that we were engaged in. This
I regret, because I know that the Agency would have been more helpful if
it had been more deliberately tasked, very specifically tasked, with clearer
emphasis on what was needed, and perhaps with clearer identification, earlier,
of what really is not all that helpful to the top policymakers.
Today, with that as my point of departure,
I'd like to talk to two subjects. The first pertains to the past. And particularly,
it involves the Agency and its support for the President and his immediate
associates--the relationship of the Agency to the Presidential-level decisionmaking
process. One here has to pause and immediately emphasize something, which
is quite obvious but needs to be stressed nonetheless: How much time can
the President give to the consumption of intelligence? The answer is, "Very
little." Most people don't have a sufficient appreciation of the enormous
time pressures, the disruptive time pressures, under which the President
works. Most people simply do not appreciate the volume of paperwork that
flows to his office, under enormous pressure from every branch of the government
for access to the President. I once did an analysis of how many pages come
in for the President every day from the Secretary of State, from the Secretary
of Defense--and through him, of course, from the Joint Chiefs as well--and
from the Director of Central Intelligence. They were destined for the President,
but they would come to me first. It came to 300 pages a day.
I was initially naОve enough to feel
that if the Secretary of State, or the others, sent me this material for
the President, I perhaps ought to annotate it and give it to the President.
And then I realized that the President would actually read it. At least
the President I worked for would read it and would annotate it and would
send it back. It soon dawned on me that this made absolutely no sense,
that I wasn't serving the President well, and that the President was becoming
overwhelmed with data and facts that he couldn't consume, and from which
he couldn't extract all policy-relevant insights. And I cut down the volume
to about 40 pages a day, either summarizing the rest, or, very often--since
I had a relationship with the President that gave me some confidence--responding
on his behalf to the memoranda, on the assumption that if there was some
subsequent dispute, I would be in a position to explain to the President
what the reasons were for my response. I had sufficient confidence that
in most cases he would say that this was the correct response.
The President, of course, would read
every day the President's Daily Brief. This is perhaps the
most important communication between the Agency and the President. And
the years in which I was in the White House, the President's Daily Brief,
I think, was very helpful to the president on some major issues, notably
arms control and the strategic dimension. By and large, the quality of
the reporting was excellent. It was informative. It was detailed. It was
comprehensive in providing us a very detailed, essentially accurate picture
of Soviet strategic development, deployments, weapons characteristics,
arms control negotiating postures, and so forth. It was similarly excellent
in some areas of the Soviet economy, which had either international implications
or were significant to internal Soviet development, such as the oil industry.
And the President would absorb that and would follow it in great detail.
It did not provide much help to the
President, however, in determining what the Soviets, in general, were trying
to do. What struck me about the PDBs was that they were informative specifically,
but not enlightening generally. They did not, in my view, give the President
and the other principal consumers of the PDB, which were three or four
people in the entire government, a good sense of what the Soviet strategy
of the time actually was. What is it that the Soviets were trying to do,
for example, in the Persian Gulf/African area, in South Africa, in the
Ethiopian Horn, subsequently in Afghanistan, and in 1980 in Poland?
The President's Daily Briefs,
while helpful in our understanding of the specific numerical dimensions
of the Soviet military establishment, were also not very helpful in giving
us a comprehensive sense of Soviet war planning. We had a good understanding
of Soviet capabilities in the strategic area and in the conventional area.
But, curiously enough, the connection between the two was not clearly made.
And it was not until much of the material that Poland's Colonel Kuklinski
provided us was fully digested that the organic interrelationship between
Soviet strategic forces and conventional forces in comprehensive
war-making emerged more clearly.
We had a sense of the specifics, but the two were treated largely as separate
phenomena: Soviet strategic war-making as one dimension, Soviet conventional
war-making as a separate dimension, but the two, in my view, were not fully
integrated.
More generally, I would say that
when it came to drawing a broad picture that was analytically helpful to
the President, "in-shop" work--in the White House--using CIA inputs, was
more helpful to the President. I have in mind, for example, the product
called PRM-10, Presidential Review Memorandum No. 10, which is a comprehensive
assessment of the American-Soviet competition. It was produced under the
directorship of Samuel Huntington, who was detailed at the time to the
White House, and it reached the basic conclusion that while there was military
equivalence between the United States and the Soviet Union, trends in the
military dimension were essentially adverse for the United States, but
the United States was superior and gaining in all other areas--and that,
hence, the competition outside of the military dimension was actually favoring
the United States, and increasingly so. Now that was an important conclusion.
But it emerged out of the use of intelligence data by White House staffers,
sensitive to the larger picture that the President needed to have, which
they then, using the data, were able to provide.
I would say that, in general, I found
it helpful for the NSC staffers to have access to raw intelligence, because
that greatly increased their ability to draw the right kinds of conclusions
for Presidential use. When it came to broad, sweeping, bold insights into
the future, by and large the PDB did not provide it, and the Agency did
not provide it, whereas from within the staff, occasionally, it was developed.
I have in mind, for example, a document that was prepared by my military
aide, who subsequently became the head of NSA, General William Odom, in
which the conclusion was stated very explicitly--this was in the late'70s--"The
Soviet Union," and I'm quoting, "The Soviet Union, however militarily strong
it is becoming, suffers enormous centrifugal political forces. A shock
could bring surprising developments within the USSR, just as we have seen
occurring in Poland. The dissolution of the Soviet empire is not a wholly
fanciful prediction for later in this century. US policy should sight on
that strategic goal."
Now this is something which some
of us in the White House also felt instinctively. I, for example, felt
very strongly that the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union was the
Achilles heel of the Soviet Union, and I insisted that there be an interagency
group created to address the nationalities problem. The State Department
opposed that initiative, and I remember vividly the argument that was made
to the effect that there is no nationalities problem in the Soviet Union--that
there is, in fact, a Soviet nation emerging. The interagency group was
created, and then it led to a covert program which the Agency undertook,
euphemistically and elegantly called a program for the "delegitimization"
of the Soviet system. It was a program designed to exploit national tensions
within the Soviet Union.
And all that leads me to two basic
conclusions. First, that intelligence for the President was excellent on
the level of factology, weak on the level of "politology." And the President,
and people around him, needed "politological" assessments and insights.
It is very difficult for an institution which has to concentrate on being
reliable, whose data has to be verifiable, to provide such broad insights,
and yet that is what policymakers need.
This leads me to another conclusion,
which perhaps is equally unpalatable to some in this room, namely that
the president's intelligence briefing should not be, in most cases, given
by the Agency. It should be given by the President's National Security
Advisor, because the President's National Security Advisor knows what the
presidential interests are. He knows the policy issues that are being discussed.
He knows how the President's mind works--or should know after a while.
And he is, therefore, in a better position to digest that information,
to reinforce it with his own views, or from his own access to raw data,
and to provide for the President the kind of picture that he needs to have
when dealing with an important challenge such as that from the Soviet Union.
In specific instances, when it comes
to briefing the President, for example, on the personalities of Soviet
leaders, or on the characteristics of Soviet weapon systems, or on particular
Soviet initiatives, yes, direct briefings by the Agency, either by its
Director or, better still, by the pertinent analysts, make a great deal
of sense. But only in that context, and not as a general routine. This
is a sensitive point because there used to be times when the President
was regularly briefed by the head of the Intelligence Community. There
were other times when he was not. My own experience leads me to the view
that, by and large, in most cases the latter is the preferred bureaucratic
course of action.
Now let me use that as a point of
departure for sharing with you some thoughts in the second half of my presentation.
Since this is a keynote address toward the end of your conference, it doesn't
quite fit into the format of this event, but I hope you'll forgive me,
and perhaps some of you might find it of interest. Essentially, the second
half of my comments is an attempt, on the basis of what I have said, to
share with you what it is that I would want to task the Agency to do today
if I were the current National Security Advisor, and if I were in the position,
therefore, to task the Agency as to what ought to go into the President's
Daily Brief.
And in doing so, I want to preface
my remarks by saying that, in focusing this tasking on Russia, I'm aware
of two new realities. The first is that Russia is not an enemy, and, therefore,
the whole spirit of the tasking is different. But Russia is a player, and
Russia is a competitor, and Russia is probably more a competitor than a
partner, and, therefore, the need for good intelligence is as intense as
ever. Second--and this is important in view of what I will now be saying--I
find Russia today obviously much more porous than ever before. Much more
porous. I felt in the earlier phase that we never had enough HUMINT, but
I was also aware of the fact that there were obvious objective impediments,
which restricted the acquisition of human intelligence. This is no longer
the case. Russia is a very porous society. Its elite is very corrupt and
very susceptible to material incentives. And, as a consequence, I think
there is relatively little excuse today for not having good HUMINT regarding
Russia. I can see some excuses being still pertinent in regard to China.
In regard to Russia, there's really no excuse for the Agency not to have
truly, truly excellent HUMINT. And that would be my assumption in tasking
the Agency. And if the Agency was unresponsive to the tasking, I'd view
it as a bureaucratic deficiency from which appropriate conclusions ought
to be drawn regarding the leadership and operations of the Agency. [laughter]
View it as an incentive.
The first tasking is very
obvious. I would like the President to be told by the Agency what Russia's
strategy is toward the United States? What is it, exactly, that Putin and
his leadership are trying to achieve in the relationship with the United
States? And more broadly, can its view of the role of the United States
in the world be defined? Can it be crystallized? What are the essential
components? And, in that context, how realistic is that strategy? Is there
a relationship between goals and means that is reasonably balanced in that
Russian strategy? More specifically, how is one to view Russia's courtship
of Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Iran, and Vietnam? Is it to be viewed
as a strategy, or as a stupidity? Or, perhaps, as a combination of the
two? In other words, a stupid strategy. [laughter] How do we assess it?
What conclusions do we draw from it? Is there a significant difference
between Russia's declaratory policy--what is stated by Russian leaders,
including the President of Russia--and actual policy? Can we see that there
is a difference between the two? Or are they the same? And here, obviously,
the thing to do would be to compare the thinking of Russian think tanks,
some of which produce serious papers on Russian geo-strategy, with internal
Kremlin policy papers. Yes, compare the two. And if the Agency doesn't
have access to them, it's not doing its job, because these papers do involve
a lot of officials and presumably, in the new circumstances, some form
of cooperative access to such people should by now have been established.
Second, I would like to see
the Agency provide the President with a comprehensive counterintelligence
assessment of Russia's intelligence goals in the United States. What is
their scope? And how comprehensive are Russian intelligence programs in
the United States? This, incidentally, should inform us somewhat about
the first cluster of issues as well, and therefore it is an important undertaking,
since we do know that Russian intelligence operations continue. What is
their scope? How coherent are they? How would we assess them?
Third, what is the Russians'
assessment of Bush's foreign policy team? How do they assess the individuals
on the team and the relations between them? What policy and personal weaknesses
in the Bush team have the Russians detected? And what conclusions did they
draw from the foregoing assessment? Obviously, that is important also in
determining the nature of Russian-American interplay.
The fourth cluster of issues
pertains to NATO, and, specifically, in what NATO governments do the Russians
have the greatest influence? They do have some influence in some governments.
We know that they had an influence in the earlier years, and we learned
a great deal more about that after the unification of Germany, when certain
files became accessible, and when it became obvious that some very senior
West German officials were, perhaps, subject to classification as agents
of influence. How is that influence now exercised within the NATO agreements?
And are the new members heavily penetrated? And who among them the most?
I think that is certainly of relevance, given the continued importance
of NATO in American national security policy.
The fifth cluster of issues
pertains to Russia's short-term intentions and likely actions regarding
its immediate neighbors--most specifically, Ukraine and Georgia. What are
the principal targets of Russian policy insofar as these two countries
are concerned? More specifically still, how is [Ukrainian President] Kuchma's
crisis being exploited? Do we see any alternatives to Kuchma? Incidentally,
in the context of that crisis and challenge, what do we know about the
Russian role in the attempts to assassinate Shevardnadze? And what does
it tell us about Russian policy towards the Southern Caucasus?
The sixth cluster of issues
pertains to weaponry. What new weapons, with emphasis on the word "new,"
are the Russians producing, or more likely, still developing? Are they
likely, given their financial limitations, to attempt to skip a generation
of weapons and to leapfrog in weapons development? If one is strapped financially,
perhaps it makes more sense to skip a generation and then to obtain a marginal
advantage. What do we know about that? Connected with it, of course, is
the question of Russian weapons sales, and there is a sustained interest
in this. It‘s probably "carrying coals to Newcastle," but it is important
to note. And one might add to it the question of whether and, if so, how
much of the Nunn-Lugar funds have been siphoned off by the Russians, either
for weapons development, or, more likely, simply because of corruption,
because the Nunn-Lugar program is of some importance.
The seventh set of issues
pertains to other aspects of Russia's foreign policy, and, specifically,
the world of Islam. Have the Agency and/or the Bureau been drawn into Russia's
conflict with Islam to the south of Russia? Have the Russians been aided
by US agencies in the war against Chechens, perhaps under the rubric of
antiterrorism? For there have been such allegations in the mass media.
This is an issue not easy to deal with, because it raises very sensitive
moral and political problems, and it is probably not an issue that any
of the elements in the agencies would like to own up to if it is seriously
probed. And yet it has a bearing on foreign policy and also has a bearing
on our own definition of our national interests, and on how we best pursue
it.
The eighth set of questions
pertains to some of our own domestic aspects. More specifically, what is
the role of the Russian mafia in the United States? Has any of the money
of the Russian mafia in the United States been channeled into the political
process in the United States? And, if so, to whom and why? And, is it purely
a criminal activity? Or is there a tie-in here between criminal activity
and political objectives of the Russian government?
Ninth is an extension of the
foregoing, namely, how active and well-financed are American PR firms and
law firms in acting as representatives of Russian interests in the United
States? Which ones can be identified as purely private business activities?
And, which ones spill over, essentially, into activities which also promote
more directly the national political objectives of Russia? Which firms
are most active? The same set of questions can be applied to some American
think tanks. To what extent do some of them have a relationship with Russia
that has become extensive to a degree in which it is at least worthy of
observation?
Tenth, and last, what American
policies is Russia most determined to counter, and, if so, how might it
seek to achieve effective countering of such American policies?
I would love to see the answers to
these questions. I'd love to be a consumer, and to see what they present.
I want to emphasize again that the purpose of these questions is not to
wage some sort of a new Cold War against Russia. But it is to deal with
Russia as a serious competitive player on the international scene, and
a country with highly developed intelligence traditions--a country which
puts a lot of emphasis on the use of covert activity in the context of
the pursuit of its foreign policy goals. I assume that many of the answers
to my questions would be benign. But I think answers to these questions
are needed. And I think a President, in shaping policy and in trying to
establish a stable relationship with Russia in this day and age, would
be well-served if he had access to essentially politically oriented, policy-decisionmaking-oriented
questions of this sort, which I would be tempted to task the Agency if
I were still in office today. Thank you.
Questions and Answers
Question: Toward the end of your
list of taskings, Zbig, you entered a zone of fuzziness of the boundaries
among the traditional disciplines of intelligence, counterintelligence,
law enforcement, business, politics, and crime. That's a fuzziness that
has gotten a lot worse since you were the National Security Advisor, just
because of the globalization of everything. You could give the same speech
about tasking on China. Could you reflect on how our institutions and our
policies and our laws might have to adjust to deal with this fuzziness?
I mean, you might go in and say, "Mr. President, a Russian criminal syndicate,
let's call it Beta, has just bought a position of strength in the law firm
for which your golfing partner now works." And he says, "Zbig, I don't
want to hear that."
ZB: Well, he might say, "I
don't want to hear that," or he might say, "I can't do anything about it,
but it's good to know it." That's an important difference. I would want
him to know it. Now, if he decides he doesn't want to do anything about
it, he is the President, not I. But I think it's the kind of thing he ought
to know about. You're right-- fuzziness, yes. But fuzziness does not mean
that one should not know about it. The area is gray, and, therefore, what
we do specifically about it is limited. Not every kind of activity is subject
to criminal litigation. But, because it isn't subject to criminal litigation,
it isn't the kind of activity you don't want to know about.
And I think the President precisely
needs to know that, because we do, indeed, live in a more fuzzy era, a
more porous era, and an era in which peculiarities of the American political
system are being perhaps exploited, in a much more intelligent fashion
than was the case heretofore. You know, during the height of the Cold War,
the Communist Party of the United States was probably of very limited assistance
to the Soviets, but it was a major preoccupation to us. And far more important
are potential agents of influence, or people who play an ambiguous role,
essentially performing a perfectly legal activity, for example lobbying,
but at the same time being instruments of foreign policy, which affects
American national interest. So this fuzziness, I think, underlines the
difficulty of the task, but it doesn't negate the importance of the task.
And I would say the task is more important than ever, precisely because
the situation is fuzzier.
And you're quite right: the same
is true of the Chinese. I think a lot of the things I said about what I
would task the Agency to do in regard to Russia, I would apply to China--a
lot of it, not all of it. But I would say also that I would have far lower
expectations of the Agency delivering in the case of China today. Right
now, there's no excuse for not having very good penetration of the Russians.
Actually, we've done pretty well in this regard. One of the reasons, for
example--just as an aside--that I don't worry too much over Russian arms
sales to the Chinese is that I'd rather have the Chinese buy Russian weapons,
which we now know extremely well--some of which we could perhaps show the
Chinese ourselves--than have the Chinese buying the stuff from the French,
or the British, or the Israelis. Anybody else? Or was this the only question?
Question: Because of our Constitution,
we have three elements of government, and, of course, there is the Congress.
The questions that you pose should be also posed by those gentlemen on
the Hill, not all of whom understand anything about the world, and the
constitution doesn't allow weighted votes depending upon knowledge. I understand
that recently there was a survey, and it found that a great percentage
of our Congressmen don't even have a passport. Under these circumstances,
how can we, from your background and experience, also educate Congress
so that it, in turn, can support the Executive?
ZB: You know, actually, this
business about most of the Congressmen not having passports and not having
traveled abroad is a canard. It is totally inaccurate. Most of them actually
do have passports, and a very large majority of them travel abroad a lot,
to the point that at the same time Congress is also criticized for a lot
of boondoggles, such as Congressmen traveling to Paris to have serious
discussions, let's say, about SDI, with a prolonged stopover on the Riviera--which,
however, still is culturally enlightening, I have no doubt. [laughter]
You know, Congress is not all that
bad. I have had a lot of dealings with Congressmen and Senators. When I
say that, of course, I really mean the three Committees that are of interest
to me, which are the Armed Services Committees, the Foreign Relations Committees,
and the Intelligence Committees. I would say the quality is pretty good,
the staffs are pretty good, and the Chairmen of the Committees are pretty
good. Don't underestimate the US Congress. It's not bad at all in terms
of seriousness, hard work, and dedication. So, yes, of course, the same
kind of educational process that engages the top policymakers, which the
Intelligence
Community furthers, would serve the Congress well, but a great deal of
it takes place, and, in any case, basic decisions in the national security
area are still made by the Executive Branch.
My own experience--and that is what
I wanted to talk about today--my own focus was on the President, and here
the relationship between the President and the Agency is very important.
And it hasn't been over the years all that satisfactory. There have been
tensions between National Security Advisors and DCIs. Not always has intelligence
been used well, and particularly, I think, not always has intelligence
been tasked well. And I plead guilty to that myself, because I remember
as I look back now over the years in which I served, that very often we
were critical of what we were getting, but we weren't very clear in demanding
what we needed, although probably the Agency could not have provided it
then the way it can provide it, in some cases, now.
Question: I think I know what
your answer's going to be to this, but I'd be interested in your comments
on the recent Council on Foreign Relations Report. I just speed-read it
when it came across my desk last week, and as I understood it, it was to
downgrade the position of the National Security Advisor to one of administration,
and upgrade the State Department to make it the primary formulator and
source of recommendations on foreign policy
ZB: It's a report which is
being read with intense interest and admiration in the Department of State
[laughter] and it's a report of a task force chaired by a very good friend
of mine, Frank Carlucci, who was a National Security Advisor and Secretary
of Defense. It's a report which was written by my son, [laughter] so I
know the report well. [laughter]
I think the report, actually, comes
at a very good moment for two reasons. One, the Department of State is
in a mess. It has been badly run. It has been badly organized. It has been
badly financed. It needs, really, pulling together, and I think the new
Secretary is determined to do that.
Secondly, there's another good reason
for this report right now. Not every President makes foreign policy decisions
the same way. It is my absolute conviction, based on some degree on experience,
that the role of the National Security Advisor and the role of the President's
Secretary of State are not determined by the degree to which they're able,
or energetic, or ambitious, or assertive, or whatever. It is determined
predominantly--I would say exclusively--by the kind of decisionmaking process
in the area of foreign policy that the President practices by his own personal,
as well as political, proclivity. If a President is interested in foreign
affairs, and wants to make foreign policy decisions on the basis of his
own informed judgments, and to make them, I repeat, personally, the National
Security Advisor becomes the automatic bureaucratic beneficiary of the
propensity. He is the person who sees the President all the time; he is
the person whom the President appointed because, presumably, he finds him
or her congenial, personally as well as intellectually. He is the person
with whom the President works, and given the volume of decisionmaking that
goes to the President, and comes back from him, not every decision can
be made by the President. In that setting, the National Security Advisor
makes decisions on behalf of the President, and, unless the Secretary of
State, or the Secretary of Defense, is particularly obtuse, he or she will
realize that the National Security Advisor has a relationship with the
President. They know if they go back to the President, the National Security
Advisor will go to the President's office, explain why he did that on his
behalf, and the President, in most cases, will say, "You did the right
thing." If he didn't feel that way, he wouldn't have that person around.
But if the President is not interested
in foreign affairs, basically, or is preoccupied with domestic affairs,
the Secretary of State is the natural Constitutional and institutional
beneficiary of that condition and is the principal player. And we have
seen both systems since 1945, and some of them have worked well in both
cases, and some of them have not worked well in both cases, but we have
had both systems. And I think this President is much more like President
Reagan--and President Reagan was a very successful President--more like
President Ford, more like President Truman. Eisenhower, actually, was,
I think, falsely presented as being different. He was much more of an internal
player than most people realize--once you read the NSC archives, you realize
he was a much more hands-on President. But Bush is much more like Reagan,
Ford, maybe Johnson, Truman. I don't think when the decision was made recently
to bomb Iraq that President Bush spent much time meditating upon it or
reflecting upon it. I suspect the decision came in with a recommendation,
and the President probably said to the Vice President, "Do you have any
problems with it?" And he said, "No." And the National Security Advisor
said, "No." "Well, if Rummie and Colin are for it, that's fine. That's
it." And in that setting, the Secretary of State is going to predominate.
So I think that report, actually, came in at the right moment, because
the State Department needs revitalization, and the Secretary of State in
this Administration is going to be much more the central player.
Question: You have alluded
to the content of the tasking. But what about an "op ed" that would appear
with advice on how the National Security Advisor would task the DCI, because
I think you have alluded to some things, and it would be interesting if
you could sketch out two or three, if you were writing advice to Condoleezza
Rice, for example.
ZB: Well, you know, again,
that's to some extent something that's very difficult to generalize about,
because it's very much a question of the personal relationship. My DCI--
my, meaning in my time--was a Naval person, an Admiral, you know, used
to operating in a military setting. Clear-cut orders, clear-cut execution.
He had a very sophisticated Deputy, Frank Carlucci, who was politically
savvy. That dictates one pattern of behavior. If you have a more politically
minded DCI, it becomes a different process. Some people prefer oral instructions
to written instructions, but I think probably if I were the DCI today,
I would have written up what I said today. But I wouldn't have sent it
all at once, because I think that would have caused internal disruption
at the Agency. I'd probably kind of give it to them once every ten days.
[laughter] And see how they handle it. [laughter]
Question: Zbig, let me go
back to the first half of your remarks-- what you thought of intelligence,
especially when you were Security Advisor. We've had a lot of discussion
on and off about politicization of intelligence, and I have a twofold question
about it from your perspective. First, did you feel that at least in some
areas the intelligence you were getting was excessively influenced by the
political predispositions of either the institutions of the CIA or the
individuals in it? And, second, perhaps contradictory, did you sometimes
feel that the Agency, the extent of the excellence, or the acuity of the
analysis, was inhibited by their fear of being politicized, by their fear
of either catering to what you wanted, or knowing they felt that if they
learned too much about what people, who we now call consumers, were interested
in, that they would be sacrificing their professional standing?
ZB: Well, to the first question
the answer is clear--never. I never had the sense that the analysis or
the data I was getting was somehow or other contaminated by political preferences
or leanings. I can't really say the extent to which people in the Agency
sensed some sort of maybe indirect pressure emanating from my office or
from me personally. It's hard for me to answer that. But knowing both Turner
and Carlucci, I would say they were not the kind of people who would be
intimidated by that. I think they sensed a different kind of pressure,
namely a feeling of impatience and dissatisfaction with the quality of
political intelligence, which was, to some extent, a criticism of the level
of political analysis, because it didn't fit well enough with what we were
thinking about, and perhaps we weren't clear enough here in indicating
that. And, secondly, because they didn't have the kind of access, political
intelligence, or HUMINT, that I really felt even then they should have
had more of. And I did feel that the culture of the Agency did not emphasize
enough the need for HUMINT. So, in that respect, I do think there may have
been some sort of a problem here, but on balance I would say no.
Question: Aren't you worried
about the fact that if the National Security Advisor takes over the function
of briefing the President, that that person would tend to emphasize those
things which bear out the wisdom of his previous advice? Even with the
best will in the world, the fact that the Advisor had been giving advice
on a given set of issues would tend to lead him or her to emphasize those
aspects of the briefing.
ZB: Well, there's probably
some risk of that, but, you know, at those levels of government, you have
colleagues who are never shy in revealing your shortcomings to your boss.
[laughter} So there would be certainly some instruments capable of correcting
that reality. The question is, would the briefings be better and more informative
if they were delivered directly by the DCI? And here, without making personal
judgments about individual DCIs, I would say in most cases it is quite
clear that they would not be. Because most DCIs are not chosen for either
their briefing ability or because of their engagement in foreign policy
issues and policymaking. And, therefore, they don't have that kind of ability
to relate to the central interests of a President. So, no, I don't think
that would be a problem. I think one of the reasons that some Presidents
have, in fact, shied away from direct briefings by either the DCI or the
Agency is that they simply don't find these briefings helpful to what preoccupies
them.
Perhaps the DCI could be helped in
that respect by the National Security Advisor, but the National Security
Advisor has many other tasks, you know. You try to do the best job you
can, as effectively as you can, and as directly as you can. It is normal
for the National Security Advisor and the DCI to be bureaucratic allies.
That's very important. In my case, for example, I wanted the DCI to be
in on the foreign policy breakfast that the President had every Friday
with his National Security Advisor, the Vice President, the Secretary of
State, and the Secretary of Defense. I repeatedly tried to get the DCI
in there, but, for reasons which I've never quite understood--because it
wasn't explained to me--I was told repeatedly by the person who made the
decision as to who attended that breakfast--and to whom we then subsequently
always refunded the $1.75 fee for the breakfast [laughter]-- that he didn't
want that. And that's his choice. It's he who decides that. But I think
the bureaucratic relationship between the National Security Advisor and
DCI is normally that of an alliance.
Question: Just before lunch,
we listened to a number of speakers at the last panel who told us that
the feeding of raw intelligence to the Soviet leaders, the Politburo people,
was a bad thing for their decisions. But in your talk, you said both for
yourself and on behalf of the NSC Staff that getting raw intelligence would
be a good thing. I wonder if you'd expand on that, and say why you think
that would be good.
ZB: The reason I think it's
good is that I think that, generally speaking, the people who are on the
NSC Staff are there because they are very good analysts, and because they
have a pretty good grasp of the issues that they face. They are typically
the cream of the crop from State Department, the cream of the crop from
Defense, and from the Agency itself, with an occasional smattering of leading
policy-oriented academics. It's an elite group. So, by and large, the chances
are that they are at least as good or better than analysts working within
the departments, and the same time, they are working in tune with the National
Security Advisor, and through him, with the President. Therefore, they
know better than the others what are the issues that confront the decisonmakers,
and which kind of information is most important to them.
Last, but not least, having access
to raw data also provides you with an opportunity to test your own judgment
against the subsequent inflow of duly processed and vetted intelligence
analysis from the agencies that used that raw data, and, therefore it gives
them an additional framework. For example, I mentioned the material from
Col Kuklinski. I used to get it both ways, as raw and as analysis. And
I found it very useful to have that combination. But I certainly liked
raw data. I was always fascinated in reading, for example, what certain
governments were talking about, or what people were reporting, and so forth.
It's very useful if you're negotiating with someone to know what their
instructions were in real time, and what they're then reporting. You can't
wait for that to come back vetted by three layers within some institution.
Question: We've been talking
at the conference about National Intelligence Estimates and larger products.
Can you comment on how you used them, if you did, and what you thought
of the quality of the ones you read while you were using them?
ZB: I would say, on balance,
that they tended somewhat to lag behind the flow of events. While they
were useful in a kind of broad perspective sense, they tended to be somewhat
outpaced by the flow of issues, and, therefore, they weren't really central
to the kind of decisions one had to make, most often on the basis of somewhat
imperfect knowledge. I would say that would be broadly my reflection on
it. It's the kind of thing that I would read, and I would expect my staff
to read; I'm not sure in most cases the President really had the time to
read and digest it. I think the real problem everywhere, as we talk on
this subject, is the connectivity between the dilemmas of decisionmaking
and the direct relevance of the information that should enlighten it. And
it's very hard to achieve in an institution in which the culture over the
years was greatly influenced by scientific, technological successes, with
a lot of emphasis on hard data, and the relative absence of more traditional
intelligence successes. This is why I said earlier in my comments that
I thought the Agency was superb in "factology," not very good in "politology."
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