MR. WATTENBERG: Hello, I'm Ben Wattenberg. When President Bush faces
off with Russian President Vladimir Putin this week in Slovenia, it marks
the first meeting between the head the world's sole superpower and the
leader of a once mighty nation, now in trouble that until recently formed
the core of the world's co-superpower. The transition from the Soviet system
to one based on democracy and market capitalism was once viewed with great
optimism, both inside and outside of Russia. The reality has been sobering.
Many observers now find Russia's economic reforms ineffective and its democratic
reforms threatened. A recent issue of The Atlantic Monthly put it bluntly:
"Russia is finished." Is Russia Finished? And what does finished mean anyway?
What might it all mean for America?
To find out, Think Tank is joined by three noted observers, Leon Aron,
resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and author of Yeltsin:
A Revolutionary Life, Clifford Gaddy, fellow at the Brookings Institution
and co-author of Russia's Virtual Economy and Dmitri Simes, president of
the Nixon Center and author of After the Collapse, Russia Seeks its Place
as a Great Power.
Topic before the house: Whither Russia? This week on Think Tank.
The results of Russia's post-Soviet experiment have been mixed. Ten
years after the fall of the Soviet empire, representative democracy still
stands, but the health care system is catastrophic. Life expectancy for
Russian men stands at 61 years, compared, for example, to 76 years for
American men. The absence of a reliable banking system and the obstacles
confronting business have convinced many that Russia is a poor investment.
Corruption, mafia-style is rampant. Russian President Vladimir Putin has
promised to stabilize Russia's economy and to restore its international
prestige, but the man and his views remain a mystery. He has appointed
former military and intelligence operatives to oversee elected regional
governors and according to reports, journalists with Russia's fledgling
independent press have been threatened. Some observers say turbulence is
not unexpected in a country struggling to establish a new order and to
create a new identity. After all, it happened in America.
Gentlemen, thank you for joining for us. Let's just go around the room
quickly, starting with you Leon, is Russia finished?
MR. LEON ARON: No, Ben, it's complete nonsense. I have three problems,
main problems with this analysis. First, it takes post-communist Russia
as if it had no history, as if it was not preceded by a state that was
corrupt, the economy, which was militarized, falling apart, bankrupt, stealing
and thievery all over the place. Virtual economy wasteful, 70% percent
related to the military production. I'm talking about pre-'91, pre-Yeltsin
economy and in corruption, for example, was one of the key legitimizing,
mobilizing issues of perestroika. I mean this is how people were mobilized.
MR. WATTENBERG: Hold on. Cliff, you buy that? Russia finished? Russia
almost finished? Russia in deep trouble? Or Russia coming up the slope?
MR. CLIFFORD GADDY: Russia has trouble. Russia has troubles ahead, but
Russia is by no means finished. A couple of years ago, I think that there
might have been some and I think there was some reason to really question
Russia's future, but it's interesting is that's exactly the question that
people inside Russia were asking themselves and it explains to a large
extent while Vladimir Putin was selected and has become so popular inside
Russia, because he has posed as the challenge for the nation to try to
revive it. And he has been to some degree successful.
MR. WATTENBERG: The spike in oil prices has helped, hasn't it?
MR. GADDY: The spike in oil prices has been critical for the Russian
economy. From the beginning of 1999 to the beginning of the year 2000,
world oil prices went up from about under $10 a barrel to around $30 a
barrel. This has been tremendously important to give Putin, coincided exactly
as he comes into office, a breathing space; a period in which he can use
that time to consolidate political power and the economy within the country.
MR. WATTENBERG: Dmitri, consolidate political power, is that the code
word for repression?
MR. DMITRI SIMES: Well, you have to look at the Yeltsin era. Yeltsin,
with an exception for a short period in 1996 and 1998, always relied very
heavily on security forces. Most unsavory KGB generals were part of his
entourage and were instruments of his power. This is not new. I think that
the issue today is consolidation and stabilization of the Russian society.
There is still a lot of repression. There are many undemocratic practices,
but you have to heed the direction and the direction is not toward greater
repression. The direction is to restoration of a certain degree of stability.
MR. WATTENBERG: You have all three of you been to Russia in the last
two or three months. Even weeks. You were then in March, Cliff? You went
outside of Moscow?
MR. GADDY: Well, I've been outside of Moscow for the past ten years
in particular, but even in Moscow if you go behind the main streets, if
you go to ordinary suburban neighborhoods, and in particular, if you have
to deal with reality the way ordinary Russians do, you quickly realize
that it's not all the glitter of Verskaya Street, the main street or around
Red Square. And what's more outside of Moscow, we find a big, big drop
off.
MR. WATTENBERG: Let me ask you something else. Something you read about-it's
in that Atlantic article, it always comes up, is that the Soviets, the
Russians excuse me, have a history of repression and subjugation. The Mongols,
the Czars, the Bolsheviks and that is sort of ingrained in the Russian
character and democracy will not find a fertile field there. Do you buy
that?
MR. SIMES: Yeah, I do-
MR. WATTENBERG: You do?
MR. SIMES: Up to a point.
MR. WATTENBERG: Up to a point.
MR. SIMES: I think that a lot of what you have seen during the Yeltsin
period and Leon and I disagree about what was happening and what you see
today is not just structural, but also reflects fundamental psychological
stereotypes of the vast majority of Russian citizens and its not biological,
it's just the way people were raised, generation after generation-
MR. WATTENBERG: You say there's stereotypes, but accurate stereotypes?
MR. SIMES: Accurate stereotypes. People were raised to believe that
the state was an enemy, but also the state was always the authority. You
do not bargain with the state, either you fight against the state or obey
the state.
MR. GADDY: Or you cheat the state.
MR. SIMES: Or you cheat the state. There is no meaning of truth in the
way you have in Western societies, because you have to believe that you
will be treated with the minimal fairness by the state. To be truthful
with the state, you also have a situation of ingrained corruption, generation
after generation. I don't think it's something that will stay there forever,
but I think it will have to be addressed for several generations before
you will see any European-style democracy in Russia.
MR. GADDY: It's a powerful force of what you're describing, but it's
not biology, it's culture and history and culture and history matter in
any country.
MR. WATTENBERG: I'm in favor of biology-
MR. GADDY: I think that-I think some people have suggested it must be
because they are suggesting it's erratically. I also think it will take
some time, but it's a variable that can be affected by policy and I think-that
in not only policy within a country, but to the degree to which Russia
is integrated into the world community. Other nations, other countries
with horrible pasts and horrible episodes in their past, have been if you
want to call it civilized, they've been integrated into a set of standards-
MR. WATTENBERG: The question always comes up in vis-a-vis Russia about
the civic society and I've heard stories about how the Russian Orthodox
Church is beginning to develop some parallel structures and there's some
outside funding going in to develop this sorts of volunteeristic sorts
of infrastructure that we have so prominently in the United States. Is
that accurate?
MR. GADDY: There's a huge difference today then, of course, during the
Soviet period. There's still a huge difference between what's going on
at the grassroots level in Russia and what we as Americans might experience.
It probably is somewhat closer to some of the European countries, where
there is more-
MR. WATTENBERG: But-
MR. GADDY: But it is independent grassroots activity, more structured
through associations-
MR. WATTENBERG: But it is on ascended track?
MR. GADDY: It's definitely up from the Soviet period and I think it's
probably still on a somewhat-
MR. ARON: Let me give you a name. There were zero private charities
in 1988. Today, there are 60,000 private charities. The numbers taken from
the survey by the Economist magazine. There were-speaking of the civil
society, that's one other thing that is almost never mentioned, the post-communist
middle class. You could argue about the size. You could argue about this
income. There are 50 percent more students today in colleges and universities
then there were in the last years of the Soviet period. Seventy percent
more universities and colleges, largely because there's a mushrooming private
university and colleges phenomenon in Russia. There are books. There are
ten times more titles published today then in the last years of the Soviet
power, about 12,000 new titles every year.
MR. WATTENBERG: Your view is-we have chatted about this, Leon, is that
the process of democratization in the Soviet Union, however bumpy the past
may be, is irreversible. Is that your view?
MR. ARON: Oh, definitely irreversible.
MR. WATTENBERG: Irreversible?
MR. ARON: Definitely irreversible and I agree here with Dmitri. The
path set by Yeltsin and I think that's ultimately will be his monument
is that with all sorts of deviations, all sorts of problems and mistakes
and even malfeasance, the momentum has been such that I think it would
be difficult, even if Putin wanted to and I agree with you, he is a mystery.
He's in many ways a kind of a divided figure. A figure of many colors.
Economic policy versus his political maneuvering. Even if somebody wanted
to reverse it fundamentally, I think it would be very difficult; A, it's
not impossible, and B, when I say that it would be very difficult, doesn't
mean that somebody would not try.
MR. GADDY: I think that the democratic gains definitely are reversible
and I think it would be a fatal mistake to base policy on the assumption
that they cannot be reversed. Mr. Putin represents an enlightened KGB approach.
He has around him people who are not nearly so enlightened. They are basically
pushing him to achieve his stated objectives of a strong Russian state
and a strong place for Russia in the world as quickly as possible. He has
a much more long term view and I think that if he is not able to deliver
to them, there's going to be increasing pressure to apply more cohesive
methods than the persuasive methods he might prefer and perhaps more aggressiveness
in foreign policy, especially towards Russia's near neighbors. These kinds
of things, I think, have the potential to lead to a quite different sort
of regime in Russia then the one we've been talking about as moving towards
democracy.
MR. WATTENBERG: Would the United States of America be very interested
in Russia if it didn't have all those nuclear weapons?
MR. SIMES: Well, it should be, because in addition to nuclear weapons,
Russia has enormous natural resources. Oil-
MR. WATTENBERG: A lot of places have natural resources-
MR. SIMES: Well, as a matter of fact, in terms of natural resources
and energy, Russia is still number one in the world. Russia also is a huge
country.
MR. WATTENBERG: Russia is also a what-
MR. SIMES: A huge country. Russia has a number of weak neighbors, which
I shouldn't say are heavily dependent upon Russia, but Russia is in a position
to influence. Also, if would look at the US foreign policy agenda, so many
things depend upon Russian cooperation. If you think about America's most
important strategic relationship, this is a relationship with China. Russian
position is very important. What kind of weapons Russia will agree to supply
Russia? Would Russia agree to have some kind of tactical alliance with
China? This is very important. Russian cooperation with Iran. Russian position
on proliferation. I mean, whatever major foreign policy you deal with,
Russia has a role. It is not the same role as in the case of the Soviet
Union. Russia is not a superpower, but Russia causes a considerable impact
primarily on nuclear weapons.
MR. WATTENBERG: Let me ask you a question. A two-part question. What
do Russians think about America? And what does the Russian elite think
about America?
MR. SIMES: Well, let me start by saying that Russians are somewhat confused
about the United States. There was a period immediately-
MR. WATTENBERG: (Inaudible.)
MR. SIMES: When as far as most Russians were concerned the Americans
could do no wrong. They saw that Americans had all the answers, that Americans
loved Russia, Americans would help. Americans would bring Russia into the
world civilization. Then there was a period I would say about two or three
years ago during the war against Yugoslavia, the NATO campaign against
Yugoslavia, when there was a lot of talk in Russia about American aggression,
about America's cynical designs against Russia. I think-
MR. WATTENBERG: But was this, I mean, I hate to be simplistic about
it, was this from official Russia or from man in the street Russia?
MR. GADDY: Well, both. But I think-I'm not sure that I would agree with
Dmitri that the antipathy and suspicion toward the United States that arose,
peaked during the Kosovo war is over, that that period is over. I think
it's there, it's latent, it's simmering, I think Russians, both the elite
and the man on the street have a real distrust now. They do not know what
to think about US intentions towards their own country-
MR. WATTENBERG: But for a while during the Cold War, the line was Russia
has so many similarities to the United States. A polyglot people, a continental
country. Is Russia seeking in its soul of souls to align itself along an
American model or a European model?
MR. ARON: The one thing that is becoming very apparent is that this
longing to be like America or to be hostile to America, in other words,
to define yourself in relations with America, is a legacy of the Soviet
period. You see both-
MR. WATTENBERG: We share a common border.
MR. ARON: (Laughter.) A bit. You see both in the habits of the people
in the way that Russia is very much to the left of the United States, but
very much close to Europe in terms of how they view social obligations
of the state to the society. What should be the welfare state? What to
do with the land? But most importantly, I think in terms of their habits
and alliances, that is the European country. And while Russia still, I
think, defines itself vis-?-vis the United States, the European roots are
beginning to come up and I think that also that the elite continues to
be-because this is after all, we used to be a superpower they think, and
the elite continues to look to the United States, but I think that the
people are beginning to realize that their home after all is Europe and-
MR. WATTENBERG: What about Russia east of the Urals going out to the
far-to the equivalent of the American Wild West?
MR. ARON: Only ten million people out a hundred and fifty million Russians
live there. The dominant feeling there, Ben, is the fear of China. The
fear of Chinese colonization.
MR. GADDY: I think Russia is not looking for either an American or a
European model as much as looking for their own model and I think that
that is-that sense has increased in the last couple of years under Putin.
I think that they-most Russians, those who support Putin, think that what
President Yeltsin did was lock, stock and barrel adopt the US approach
and US definitions and standards of things like a market economy or democracy,
but Mr. Putin is saying is that; yes, we Russians will adopt democracy,
yes, we Russians will adopt a market economy, but we will define the content
of those terms. We will not allow the United States to say what meets the
standards of democracy or markets. And that's the new trend, that's a new-essentially
a new revolution, a new experiment going on in Russia for the past two
years.
MR. SIMES: I think that's exactly right. The Russians are not only not
ready for western-style democracy; they are not interested in western-style
democracy. They believe that they have to find their own way, which in
many respects will be European, but which will also be influenced by Russian
culture, Russian tradition. They also believe that they have to define
their own national interests, which they believe are not antagonistic to
the United States, but also are not identical and I think that we will
see a very complex relationship between Russia and the United States.
MR. WATTENBERG: Let me ask a question. The Russians today, at least
in the big cities, are they seeing when they turn on their television set,
are they as happens in some many places in the world, almost the entire
world, are they seeing American television? American sitcoms? Hearing American
music? Watching American movies when they go out? Is that prevalent?
MR. ARON: The elite, at least, resents it very much and every time-
MR. WATTENBERG: ...They resent it but they put their money at the box
office-
MR. ARON: Well, not necessarily. When you go there-
MR. WATTENBERG: That's a market, Leon-
MR. ARON: And you talk to the elite and again speaking of Europe, they
talk almost like the French. I mean, you go to Europe, to Russia and you
have to explain to them that what they see in primetime is some of the
worst examples of American popular culture-
MR. GADDY: It's changed a lot, wouldn't you agree, Leon, in the last
couple of years, in fact, I would say over a longer period, there has been
a revival of true Russian culture. Russian movies. Russian novels. Leon
spoke of the number of new titles being published in Russian, what's really
remarkable is so many Russian, new Russian authors writing their own books,
as opposed to translating rather trashy American crime novels and things
like that.
MR. WATTENBERG: But hold on. In Europe, about 80 cents on every dollar
spent on the movies goes to American movies. That's voting with your checkbook,
with your dollar, with your wallet. So, I mean you can say that there trashy,
you can say or whatever you want to say, everybody in the European movie
business knows that Europeans want to see American movies, just the way
Americans want to see American movies.
Now, is that true in Russia as well?
MR. SIMES: It is true in Russia, not to the same extent as in Europe
and Cliff is also right, not to the same extent as two years ago, but let
me make a point, China is a country which is also becoming increasingly
exposed to American civilization, to American values and they love things
American, in terms of popular culture, but China at the same time is becoming
more nationalist. Not only the communist elite, but young people, the students
as well. Some of that is also happening in Russia. Americans like to believe
that the more others know us, the more they love us. It's a little bit
more complicated.
MR. WATTENBERG: It's a lot more complicated.
MR. GADDY: Absolutely true. That observation is one of the really surprising
things that I've learned over the last few years in dealing with young
Russians at the university level, including those that have even been in
the United States for a year or two years, come back and become the fiercest
nationalists, because they are very eloquent and they can say; I'm not
just blindly believing anybody's propaganda, I know America now and I've
decided, I don't want that model for the future of Russia and I actually
do not trust the Americans to guide us in the right direction. That's a
disturbing trend, really.
MR. WATTENBERG: Dmitri, it is much more complicated, but that doesn't
mean it's untrue or true. Let's just go around the room, very quickly now.
This is 2001, let's make believe it's 2011, 10 years from now for the record.
What is Russia, got to be brief because we are out of time, what is Russia-how
has Russia changed?
MR. ARON: Well, I think you have private agriculture. I think Russia
is self-sufficient in food. Russia is having kind of an authoritarian type
of presidential system, pretty much what they have now. They rebuilt the
state. The state is much more important, both in economy and in terms of
providing for its citizens than it is in the United States.
MR. WATTENBERG: Is it threatening the United States ten years from now?
MR. GADDY: It's not going to directly threaten the United States, but
I think through somewhat more aggressive policies in its immediate environment,
it's going to challenge us on a number of issues. Internally, they're going
to be in about ten years, confronting some major tradeoffs, some major
problems and how to keep the stability if it lasts this long and it very
well could. I think that within eight to ten years, you're going to look
at a period of greater instability.
MR. SIMES: The Russians will have to make some critical choices and
I don't think there is any certainty what these choices are going to be,
but my assumption is that Russia will be a more stable society. It will
be more normal in Russian terms. I think they will try to develop a constructive
relationship with the United States, but that constructive relationship
will be based on self interest, not on admiration and we will be far short
of any kind of an alliance.
MR. WATTENBERG: I think we can agree that Russia is not finished. Thank
you Clifford Gaddy, Leon Aron and Dmitri Simes and thank you, please remember
to send us your comments via e-mail. For Think Tank, I'm Ben Wattenberg.
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