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Economist Fears 'Extinction' of Russia's Population

Vremya MN
10 January 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Aleksandr Deykin, economist:  "Death Will Not Be Swayed"
  
It would be wise for the Russian Government to wonder about the sense of stimulating economic growth and striving for "additional income" from taxes if all of this is only hastening the extinction of the country's population. 

Russian demographic patterns are displaying two conflicting tendencies:   The number of people dying in Russia exceeds the number of new citizens being born by two-thirds, although the birth rate is rising more quickly--by 0.01 percent--than the mortality rate.   Immigration covered part of the huge gap between the two indicators in recent years, but now migration figures are decreasing dramatically:   Migration made up for more than 45 percent of natural attrition in 1997, but the figure was below 8 percent in the first 10 months of 2001.   The birth rate obviously will not compensate for these migration losses for a long time. 

An analysis of the causes of mortality is not encouraging either:   The number of deaths due to cardiovascular diseases (the cause of 55.2 percent of all deaths) was 13 percent higher in the first 10 months of 2001 than it had been in the first 10 months of the previous year.   Deaths caused by diseases of the digestive organs increased by 3.5 percent.   Meanwhile, deaths due to infectious and parasitical diseases decreased by 0.9 percent and deaths caused by respiratory ailments decreased by 6.8 percent.   The last two causes combined, however, are equivalent to only about one-tenth of the number of cardiovascular fatalities.   Furthermore, the declining rate of fatal respiratory disorders is clearly due to the closure of many industrial production units entailing work with chemicals, paints, and other harmful substances. 

The overall result--a higher rate of mortality combined with a rising birth rate--seems confusing, but only at first.   Its direct relationship to the non-democratic (так в тексте) indices of the State Statistics Committee is evident.   Above all, there is the steady growth of the GDP.   It is true that the industrial product has decreased perceptibly in recent months along with the whole gross product:   Industrial production in November 2001 was 2.9 percent below the October figure, and GDP growth in the third quarter of 2001 was only 4.9 percent, as compared to 5.3 percent in the second quarter.   Production volume in the basic sectors decreased by 6.3 percent in November.   Changes of this magnitude during these months, however, have been characteristic of the Russian economy in recent years. 

In spite of this atmosphere of economic growth, the rate of natural attrition will reduce the population of Russia to only 140 million in five years (the figure is 144 million now, but it was about 150 million 10 years ago).   The barely noticeable "natural growth" of the population does not seem to be inconsistent with the statistical evidence of a tendency toward GDP growth, but the continuation of the essential extinction of the population offers more eloquent testimony.   Overall economic growth must be accompanied by the growth of personal income--the official indicator of the standard of living.   This seems to be the case.   The real average wage was 23.5 percent higher in November 2001 than in November 2000 (and amounted to a nominal 3,655 rubles).   The growth of the average wage during the year ranged from 8 percent (in the microbiological industry) to 61.9 percent (in the wholesale trade in 
consumer goods) in different sectors of the economy, but in most branches the increase was from 35 percent to 55 percent.   This was true, for example, of light industry, the timber industry, education, public health, and all of the fuel branches. 

The appearance of the uniform and "equitable" growth of wages is shattered completely by elementary statistical comparisons, however:   The monthly increase in wages in rubles amounted to 484 rubles in agriculture, about 560 rubles in education, and about 580 rubles in public health care, but those same average "percentages of growth" produced a monthly wage increase of 4,600 rubles in the gas industry, 3,800 rubles in the oil industry, 1,800 rubles in electrical power engineering, 2,250 rubles in transportation, 1,300 rubles in communications, and 3,000 rubles in the financial and insurance sphere.   The increase in the monopolistic branches is two or three times as high as the whole salary in some branches of the budget-funded sector.   This also has a "demographic" impact:   In the most successful branches, the recorded economic growth has produced tangible gains, quite sufficient to foster a slight rise in the birth rate for the families of workers in this relatively small number of branches.   In the spheres representing the most common occupations, on the other hand, the population is dying out.   The propaganda about "a better life and a happier life" can still act as an emotional stimulus affecting the birth rate, but death cannot be swayed by government assurances.   Obviously, there are many things our officials could do about this if they wanted to.   They would have to start, however, with a clear idea of the ultimate goal and would then have to pursue it consistently.   The recent expectations of the favorable impact of economic growth have proved to be groundless, as the earlier statistical comparisons demonstrated:   The qualitative aspect of this growth clearly has not improved the quality of life for everyone in the country.   Meanwhile, the rate of growth is declining steadily.   The government's lack of an integral social policy is an even bigger problem. 

Whereas some high-ranking officials want to focus more attention on social problems, others have been busy compounding these problems. 

One of our top officials has proposed the legitimization of paid medical services, probably forgetting that his official duties consist in maintaining and improving the standards of universally accessible health care. This nasty trick--it cannot be described as anything else--might be explainable, although it does seem inexcusable, by the inexperience of the Minister of Public Health in matters of economic and social policy.   That is "not his bailiwick" (although it does seem that he has a professional obligation to know that the governments of the largest countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Germany, have been doing their utmost for years to protect people from the ruthless vicissitudes of the medical and pharmaceutical markets).   The Deputy Finance Minister also has a professional obligation to realize that the assertion that higher taxes on medicines will not raise their prices--ostensibly because "prices determine the market"--is not only an example of economic nonsense, but also of highly dangerous nonsense.   The year has just begun, the new taxes have not even been charged yet, but the market has already pronounced its judgment on the professional competence of the Russian financial experts:   Medicine prices are already soaring, and some medicines are no longer being sold.   Meanwhile, the prices of medical services are rising more quickly than inflation, even without the Minister's permission. 

This is not the main problem, however.   In this case, the higher prices in the "self-regulating market" will have a clear-cut result:   The population will buy less of the more expensive medicine, which could not have been described as readily affordable even before, and the quality of the medical care available to most of the population will be worse than it is now.   The actions of those two officials will result in worse preventive health care and medical treatment.   That is why we should not expect a lower rate of mortality in the country, especially from diseases of the cardiovascular and digestive systems, despite all of the encouraging "economic" assurances of the government.   The value-added tax on medicine will contribute from 5 billion to 7 billion rubles to the budget.   At the end of this year, we will be able to calculate the exact "human cost" of this meager 0.5 percent of "additional income" in the federal budget by taking a look at demographic dynamics.   All of these statistics underscore the regrettable fact that our government officials are less likely than ever to coordinate their decisions and that they cannot foresee the impact of their own words and actions.
 
 

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