VALUE SYSTEM OF CHECHENS IN THE 1990s

Arguments about Chechen affairs (including some in JRL) often hang on the extent to which contemporary Chechens remain under the influence of traditional Chechen values and customs. For example, is the failure to create an effective modern state in Chechnya to be attributed to the continuing centrality of clan [teip] ties, or are the objective conditions of an isolated and war-devastated society sufficient explanation? The debate tends to take the form of a clash between the divergent impressions of different observers, but pertinent sociological data are in fact available.

Zalpa Bersanova and the Sociological Laboratory of the Chechen-Ingush Humanitarian Research Institute surveyed the values of 840 Chechens in 1990, 1992, and 1995. The sample was broken down by sex, by age-group -- comparing the younger generation (17-30 years) with the elderly (60-80 years) -- and by type of settlement, comparing villagers of the Shatoi district in mountainous southern Chechnya, villagers in three northern plains districts, and residents of Grozny (now Jokhar).

Unsurprisingly, it was found that traditional values remain more widely held among the elderly than among the younger generation, and in the mountain villages than in Grozny or on the plains. There does not seem to be any consistent pattern relating values to sex.

But the most striking results concern change over time. If one had only the 1990 data to consider, one might conclude that the appeal of traditional values, even of such a classic Caucasian value as hospitality, is not very strong and could be expected to decline further. But between 1990 and 1995 there was a dramatic revival of traditional values.

The author attributes this revival mainly to deteriorating conditions of life, first under the Dudayev regime and then as a result of war. War demonstrated the futility of material possessions, and people compensated by attaching greater importance to spirituality.

The custom of blood revenge is another case in point. In 1990 a majority even of elderly mountaineers, the most conservative part of the population, rejected the custom, but by 1995 even young city-dwellers favored it by a large margin. With the complete collapse of law and order, blood revenge had become the only means of defense against crime.

One hopeful sign is that the value attached by the young to education, much lower in 1992 than in 1990, was again at a high level in 1995, as the idea took root that "all our woes stem from ignorance."

400 лет постоянных войн России на Кавказе