RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS

WHAT IS "THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULATION"?

A current scholarly debate concerns the political significance of the category "the Russian-speaking population" -- a term widely used to refer to all the inhabitants of one of the newly independent post-Soviet republics whose primary language is Russian, irrespective of ethnic origin. Many of these "Russian-speakers" are not ethnic Russians. In fact, many belong to the titular group of the republic concerned (Russian-speaking
Ukrainians and Kazakhs etc.).

Is "the Russian-speaking population" simply a statistical construct -- the set of those people who happen to live in a particular republic and to speak Russian? Or is it, actually or potentially, a focus of political loyalty that might serve as the basis for movements in favor of autonomy or secession?

In his book "Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad" (Cornell University Press, 1998), David Laitin of Stanford University argued that "the Russian-speaking population" may indeed be emerging as such a focus of political loyalty. Similarly, the primacy of the linguistic factor in the politics of Ukraine stands out in the work of Dominique Arel of Brown University. However, in the April-June 2001 issue of
"Post-Soviet Affairs", Lowell Barrington of Marquette University presents evidence, based on surveys and focus groups conducted in Ukraine and Kazakhstan in 1998-99, suggesting that language is less important as a political factor than claimed by Laitin and Arel.

Barrington's respondents were aware of the concept of "the Russian-speaking population" and felt some attachment to it, but they chose it as the best definition of "who they were" less often than they chose citizenship, ethnic affiliation, or -- in the case of Ukraine -- region. "The Russian-speaking population" was a more popular concept among ethnic Russians than it was among Russian-speaking members of other ethnic groups.

Moreover, those Russian-speakers who did give "Russian-speaker" as their preferred identity were neither more nor less likely than other Russian-speakers to support the independence of their republic of residence. In contrast, those who identified primarily as ethnic Russians were less likely to support independence. It appears therefore that ethnic rather than linguistic identity remains the main source of anti-independence sentiment, at least in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Barrington leaves out of account one form of identity that may still matter to many Russian-speakers. He gives his respondents the option of identifying themselves as citizens of their republic of residence or as citizens of Russia, but not as Soviet citizens. In their survey of ethnic Russians in five republics, conducted in 1995-96, Louk Hagendoorn and Edwin Poppe of Utrecht University (Netherlands) found 23 per cent of respondents who
considered themselves Soviet citizens. In Kazakhstan this was the single most popular form of identification, chosen by 30 per cent of respondents ["Europe-Asia Studies," January 2001]. The interaction of "Soviet" and "Russian-speaking" identities is a research question of some interest.