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Unease At The Apex

Oxford Analytica January 5, 2006

President Vladimir Putin's reshuffle of the Russian executive in November has dealt a serious blow to the authority of Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov. Putin's appointment of Dmitry Medvedev as first deputy prime minister and Sergei Ivanov as deputy prime minister is part of a broader initiative aimed at tightening control of the presidential administration over the government's policy direction. Their promotion could also point to the succession, since the premiership has traditionally been used as a testing ground; either could replace Fradkov ahead of the 2008 presidential election.

Just a few weeks earlier, Putin created a Presidential Council for the Implementation of National Projects, with the responsibility for delivering policy in four key areas: health care, education, housing and agriculture. The establishment of the council highlights Putin's frustration with the limited progress made by the current government on a number of fronts, including administrative reform and housing. However, it is not clear that Putin's latest attempt to improve the government's efficiency has been more successful.

Despite his reputation as the least independent and politically weakest of all Russia's premiers, Fradkov has been reluctant to cede control over several key policy areas to his new deputies. Less than cordial relations with Fradkov are only one example of the obstacles facing Medvedev and Ivanov that could derail both their ability to deliver the Kremlin's policy objectives and their prospects to succeed Putin in 2008.

By undermining Fradkov's authority, Putin's action has weakened the capacity of the core executive to coordinate the policy activities of different departments. Divisions within the top echelons of the government have presented an opportunity for departmental and sub-departmental actors to press for their own policy interests. This has increased the risk of policy conflict between departments. In the weeks following the reshuffle, a number of ministries made policy announcements that ran counter to the official government line.

A recent example of this weakness at the top may be detected in the handling of the gas dispute with Ukraine. Moscow seems to have completely failed to anticipate the "collateral damage" to its relations with Western Europe, in particular the perception that Russia may not be a reliable energy supplier after all. This is likely to intensify moves to seek alternatives, reducing Russia's share in a lucrative market.

The concern is that Putin's national projects program will fail because of the same issues that have frustrated a number of earlier policy initiatives. Although Putin has successfully tamed the federal parliament and many regional authorities, he will find it more difficult to make the government responsive to top-down initiatives. New ways are being explored to improve policy coordination within the government.

Putin's efforts to increase control over government policy-making have weakened the prime minister and created a leadership vacuum that both Fradkov and his new deputies are now trying to fill. This struggle threatens to jeopardize the Kremlin's policy priorities, and Putin may have to act promptly to reestablish authority within the government. Fradkov is likely to be the first victim of such action, and the choice of his successor will probably have an important bearing on the presidential election in 2008.


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