INTERNAL POLICY PANEL:
Cornerstone Paper
by David
Satter
Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and the Jamestown
Foundation: Visiting Scholar, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies; author, Age of Delirium: The Decline and Fall of
the Soviet Union (Yale, 2000)
If Putin is to play a positive role in Russian history, it will be first
and foremost as a leader who created a basis for prosperity in Russia by
strengthening the rule of law. To this end, there are several steps which
would indicate that Putin is seriously interested in creating the conditions
for Russia's resurrection:
* Progress in solving any or all of Russia's most notorious political
murders with the arrest and trial of all of those involved in the crime,
the organizers as well as the executors.
* Openness regarding the investigation into the bombings of Russian
apartment buildings in September, 1999 and a complete and credible explanation
of why the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) decided to plant a dummy bomb
- if it was a dummy bomb - in the basement of an apartment building in
Ryazan.
* The arrest and trial of the financial oligarches
with the publication of full information about their ties to government
officials, including members of the presidential administration.
* Steps to memorialize the victims of political terror and to establish
museums or exhibits that describe fully and truthfully the crimes of communism.
* The arrest and trial of the leaders of any one of Russia's criminal
syndicates with full information about their business holdings and relation
to government officials.
In the absence of these or related measures, it will be hard to avoid
the impression that Putin seeks not to establish the role of law but to
achieve
economic progress with police methods, an effort that will not solve Russia's
problems but only compound them.
Implications for the United States
Unless something is done about Russia's lawlessness, the prospect in
Russia is for continued disintegration, and the more weak and unstable
Russian society becomes, the greater is the chance that the processes taking
a toll within the country will begin to pose a threat to the United States.
There are two types of dangers that face the United States as a result
of the internal situation in Russia: those arising from the actions of
the state and those arising from the actions of specific groups over which
Russian state structures have lost all control. In both cases, they are
a product of the chaos stemming from Russian society's underlying lack
of moral orientation.
The principal dangers arising from the actions of the Russian state
are:
Social Unrest - The failure to address Russia's economic problems could
lead to civil unrest sufficiently serious to draw in nations along Russia's
long border. More than 40 per cent of the Russian population lives in conditions
of severe poverty, and economic decline has led to a public health crisis,
alcoholism and rising rates of murder and suicide. The Russian people remain
deeply dissatisfied with the results of "reform" and this discontent could
be exploited by a demagogic leader, particularly if living standards continue
to fall.
Aggression - The deterioration of the situation in Russia could prompt
Putin or another Russian leader to launch a war of aggression against any
of the former Soviet republics to shore up popular support in the same
way as the war in Chechnya was used to help Putin win the Russian presidency.
Likely targets of a Russian war of aggression are Georgia and Azerbaijan,
and even the Baltic Republics.
The principal dangers involving groups, individuals, or institutions
over which there is no effective control are:
Terrorism - Because it is impoverished and heir to the military expertise
of the Soviet Union, Russia could become a base area for terrorism. Leaders
of Aum Shinri Kyo, the Japanese doomsday sect which launched an attack
with sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo metro, have testified that the production
designs for the manufacture of sarin were given to the sect in 1993 in
return for $100,000 in cash by Oleg Lobov, Russia's former first deputy
prime minister. Members of the sect, with Lobov's help, also trained on
Russian military bases and were frequent visitors to Russian academic institutes
where they studied the circulation of gases.
Organized Crime - Russian expertise has been a boon for organized crime.
There are presently about 30 Russian criminal syndicates operating in the
United States and they conduct some of the most sophisticated criminal
operations ever seen in the United States thanks to their mastery of computer
technology, encryption techniques, and money laundering facilities that
process hundreds of millions of dollars.
The Russian criminal syndicates have also established working relationships
with the Colombian drug cartels and have tried to arrange the sale to them
of sophisticated weapons including a Tango-class, diesel powered patrol
submarine to be used to move cocaine from Colombia to California. U.S.
law enforcement agencies take seriously the possibility that Russian criminal
gangs could obtain nuclear weapons.
Nuclear accidents - Russia could be the source of ecological disasters.
Outdated nuclear power stations, many of the same type as the power station
at Chernobyl, are operating with equipment that is in need of replacement.
At the same time, human error is increasingly possible because the employees
of nuclear power stations in Russia have gone as much as six months without
pay, causing workers to faint on the job and go on hunger strikes.
The nuclear material inside submarines could also cause a disaster.
At present, there are 45,000 nuclear fuel elements stored in the Murmansk/Archangel
Panhandle, 1,200 miles north of Moscow. Many are still inside 104 submarines
which are rapidly corroding. The shipyards have 1.8 million gallons of
liquid radioactive waste awaiting disposal as well. Disposal of the current
supply of spent nuclear materials would take an estimated 30 years, too
long to avoid a nuclear disaster.
The Theft of Nuclear Materials - Russia has 150 metric tons of plutonium
and 650 tons of highly enriched uranium stored in 400 buildings at 50 scientific
centers. Much of this supply, which is enough to make 33,000 nuclear weapons,
is not secure. Russia's nuclear sites are guarded by nearly 30,000 servicemen
but many of these soldiers have gone for long periods without pay and there
have been reports of guards leaving their posts to forage for food. In
one case, a 19 year old sailor killed eight people, locked himself in the
torpedo room of a nuclear submarine and threatened to blow up the ship.
In 1998, a soldier who was guarding a nuclear reprocessing plant in the
Ural Mountains killed two fellow guards and then fled.
At the same time, many of Russia's 20,000 nuclear scientists live in
conditions of extreme hardship and are vulnerable to recruitment efforts
by foreign powers, including North Korea which, according to an unconfirmed
report, has recruited them successfully.
Epidemics - The breakdown of the system of public hygiene in Russia
has made Russia the source of new epidemics. Among the new threats to health
that have emerged are polio, cholera and even plague. The number of new
cases of syphilis in Russia has increased 57 times in seven years from
8,000 to 450,000 in 1997. Most ominous of all, however, is the rise of
drug resistant tuberculosis, which developed in the fetid, overcrowded
Russian prisons. Persons ill with tuberculosis received only partial treatment
with antibiotics and this produced the drug resistant strain. The disease
is spreading throughout Russia as prisoners return to their communities
and its spread beyond Russia's borders is only a matter of time.
U.S. Policy
In terms of policy, there are a number of steps that the United States
can take to support a law based state in Russia.
* Make international loans contingent on realistic efforts to fight
corruption.
* Direct foreign aid toward humanitarian assistance. Russia faces a
catastrophic health care situation as reflected in falling life expectancy
and a very high death rate. Part of the reason is a shortage of medical
equipment and the unavailability of medicines due to their high cost. American
medical aid directed toward persons who would not otherwise receive assistance,
besides achieving a concrete purpose, can inspire goodwill toward the United
States and convey the message that the U.S. seeks a relationship with the
Russian people as a whole and not with any one political faction.
* Use tax incentives to encourage direct assistance to Russian regions
by private American organizations. Russians benefit from contact with non-government
organizations. Churches, schools, corporations and private individuals
who take an interest in Russia can often provide invaluable help to individuals
in need while, at the same time, helping to break the impression, too often
fostered in recent years, that America stands for capitalism and capitalism
is indistinguishable from crime.
* Fight illegal capital flight from Russia by encouraging international
efforts to crack down on offshore zones.
* Expand the Financial Intelligence Fraud Network. Russian businessmen
and criminal structures export money under the guise of paying penalties
or fees to companies which they secretly own. These front companies are
registered in offshore zones or, frequently, in Delaware, where they are
often organized into a veritable maze. The U.S. should provide the relevant
government agencies with enough resources to deny Russian criminals this
means of looting their own country.
* Keep corrupt officials and known criminals out of the United States.
Russia's corrupt businessmen and gangsters like to travel abroad. By denying
them visas, the United States can exert pressure on them and, at the same
time, disassociate itself in the eyes of Russians from their behavior.
* Provide aid to Russian law enforcement. The outstanding problem of
law enforcement in Russia is the low pay and lack of equipment of the police.
American aid to Russian law enforcement agencies can help them in what
now is a losing battle with organized crime. Among the programs which Russian
law enforcement officers most need is a witness protection program so that
ordinary Russian citizens will not be afraid to testify in court.
*Decriminalize Russian participation in American energy investments.
The U.S. should impose disclosure rules affecting joint ventures that go
beyond private company efforts. Such requirements would, for example, probably
expose criminal structures behind the existing Sakhalin energy exploitation
projects.
* Limit access to U.S. capital markets. Russian oil and gas companies
or other entities engaged in production, transportation and export should
be denied access to capital markets if there is evidence of criminalization.
In addition to its policies, the United States can affect the situation
in Russia with its rhetoric. In many respects, this is the most important
instrument of influence of all.
The Soviet Union was based on the notion that there are no absolute
standards of right and wrong but only the interests of a specific economic
class. Unfortunately, after the Soviet Union fell, the notion of class
values, in the form of faith in economic determinism, continued to dominate
on Russian territory. If the communists held that for perfect justice,
it was necessary to put property in the hands of the state, the reformers
held that all that was required for a law based state was to give property
back to private owners. In both cases, the need to establish a legal and
moral framework for economic transformation was ignored.
In this situation, the ability of the United States to identify itself
with universal values and not with any particular organization of economic
structures can have a salutary and much needed effect.
The better we are able to identify the question of values which underlies
not only justice in Russia but stability in the world, the greater will
be our impact on the Russian population. The greater our impact on the
Russian population, the better the chances that the genuine democratic
forces inside Russia will gather encouragement and strength and begin to
take steps to reversing the process of disintegration with which their
country is afflicted. In any case, we will have taken the first step toward
real engagement with the Russian people and have avoided making enemies
of a nation whose fate is actually intimately connected to our own.
FOREIGN POLICY PANEL:
Cornerstone Paper
By Dr. Richard Pipes
Professor of History, Harvard University, author of The
Russian Revolution (Vintage, 1991)
What are the prospects for Russia's foreign policy in the years ahead?
The answer to this question depends much less on the conduct of foreign
powers toward Russia than on developments inside Russia. If the country
progresses, however haltingly, toward democracy and a regime based on law,
the contrast between it and the West will diminish and the temptation to
harass and frighten the West wane as well. If, on the other hand, Russia
reverts to its traditional authoritarianism, then the chances are that
it will once again turn its back on the West. In this case it will also
feel tempted to exacerbate relations with the West because by creating
a phantom external threat and transforming the state into a "beleaguered
fortress", the country's rulers will be able, as in the past, to justify
their despotic rule. From which it follows that it is in the greatest interest
of the West to ensure Russia continues its commitment to democracy. (Adherence
to the free market is less important because, as history demonstrates,
dictatorship is compatible with concessions to private enterprise.)
In a shorter time frame, Russia, feeling excluded from Europe by NATO's
expansion into Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, seems eager to compensate
for this rejection by fashioning a bloc of its own as a counterpoise to
NATO. One expression of this effort is strengthening CIS as a surrogate
for the lost empire. Another is to draw closer to countries outside the
western bloc. Here in the forefront stands China, with which Russia has
entered into a "strategic partnership". Iraq and Iran are also suitable
partners for this purpose.
It is questionable whether over the long run the eastward orientation
will bring Russia the desired results. In its relations with China, Russia
finds it difficult to shed the sense of being the "elder brother" even
though this attitude no longer corresponds to reality. The two nations
also share a deep-seated suspicion of each other. The principal interest
they have in common is negative, namely opposition to America's global
"hegemony" and western "interference" in what they insist are their internal
affairs (Chechnya, Taiwan and human rights). As a result, negotiations
between them are stronger on anti-American rhetoric than on substance.
As for Iraq and Iran, Russia's troubles with its own Muslim minorities
also preclude close relations. In this case, too, negative factors predominate,
namely common hostility to the West, especially the United States. An important
if imponderable factor mitigating against a genuine rapprochement with
the Middle East (as well as China) is that Russians tend to look down on
Oriental people.
Thus, in the final analysis, unless Russia adopts a firm pro-western
course in both its domestic and foreign policies, it will condemn itself
to isolation which will mean, among other things, failure to participate
in the globalization of the world's economy. It raises the prospect of
it ending up as a Third World country in a First World location.
What the West can do and what should it avoid doing in its relations
with Russia?
If the above considerations are correct, the West's ability to influence
Russia's foreign is limited. Even so, it is not entirely lacking.
Russian governments watch closely the West's reactions to their behavior:
as an aspiring world power, they care how the world perceives them, and
this sensitivity gives the West a certain leverage. Forceful opprobrium
of aggressive behavior or violations of human rights makes an impression.
Conversely, Moscow interprets feeble protests, not backed up by meaningful
action, as tacit approval. The author of these lines attended two years
ago a conference in Poland devoted to the events of December 1981 when
General Jaruzelski had imposed Martial Law on his country. The general,
who took part in this conference, declared that the failure of the U.S.
government to give him unambiguous signals that it would respond to a crackdown
with severe punitive measures helped him overcome lingering hesitations.
In particular, he had interpreted Vice-President George Bush's silence
on this subject during a meeting with his deputy in early December to mean
that Washington had no objections to the imposition of Martial Law. This
incident, though it occurred under different conditions, is a useful reminder
how important it is to speak out clearly and unequivocally when Russia
or a country under its control engages in unacceptable behavior. And if
words do not produce the desired effect, the West has at its disposal powerful
financial levers.
The current campaign against Chechnya shows the counterproductive effects
of timidity. The western powers have been ineffectually protesting the
Russian army's violations of human rights in this region -- if, indeed,
mass murder qualifies as nothing more than a "violation of human rights"--
but they have done next to nothing to back such disapproval with concrete
punitive measures. Neither diplomatic relations nor financial dealings
have been affected by Russia's appalling behavior. At a recent gathering,
the Council of Europe generously allowed Russia three more months to "pacify"
Chechnya. As for Acting President Putin, the architect of Russia's aggression,
President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright have declared him a person
they can do business with. European leaders have echoed these sentiments.
At the very time when Putin promises to "kill off" all Chechen "bandits"
and subject the conquered region to direct Presidential rule, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development has extended a $150 million loan
to Lukoil, Russia's giant oil concern. And Prime Minister Blair, the first
western leader to meet with Putin since the latter became Acting President,
said as they parted, even though Putin had made no concessions on Chechnya,
that he had "greatly enjoyed the dialogue." "I believe," he concluded,
"that we and the European Union should never forget that a closer partnership
between the European Union and Russia is in the interest of all our people
and in the interests of the continent we share." To maintain the atmosphere
of bonhomie, Mr. Blair pointedly refused to voice in public any criticism
of Russia's actions in Chechnya.
Such tacit endorsement has two effects, both of them adverse. It signals
to Moscow that the West, for all its hand wringing, really does not care
what happens inside Russia. At present this sentiment affects Chechnya,
but potentially it can extend to the suppression of freedoms and civil
rights in Russia proper. It encourages Moscow in the belief that as along
as it refrains from overt aggression abroad and duly services its debts,
what it does at home is its own business. Such a way of thinking completely
misses the close link between Russia's domestic and foreign policies, and
ignores that, sooner or later, undemocratic Russian governments turn anti-western.
Secondly, western passivity discourages the democratic, pro-western
intelligentsia in Russia. This group is relatively small, comprising perhaps
no more than 10-15 percent of the electorate, and it concentrates in the
large cities. Nevertheless, it constitutes an important ally that ought
not to be abandoned. We have seen what an effect the minuscule dissident
movement had on the Soviet dictatorship.
The current western policy toward post-Yeltsin Russia shows disturbing
parallels with the "soft" approach to the Soviet Union popular during the
Cold War. Then as now, the proponents of "detente" and "Ostpolitik" acted
on the premise that given Russia's geopolitical position and nuclear arsenal
it was imperative to "get along with it," whatever its regime and the regime's
treatment of its own citizens. The supreme objective was "stability." This
approach was proven wrong for the simple reason that then as now the roots
of Russia's aggression lay in its internal condition, i.e. that its foreign
policy was (and is) determined by its constitution. The confrontational
policy of President Reagan, which proceeded on this premise, contributed
far more to the end of the Cold War than the accommodation advocated by
his critics.
The events of the past several years indicate that Russia's attempt
to adopt democracy has failed -- at any rate, for the time being. Russia
today stands at a crossroads. Its temptation is to revert to "strong" i.e.
arbitrary rule with all the adverse consequences this has for Russia's
domestic and foreign policies. The West can influence these choices only
indirectly: but such influence as it has, it should not hesitate to exert.
In summary:
* The West should never lose sight of the fact that there exists an
intimate bond between Russia's domestic and foreign policies, the latter
being a function of the former; hence that it is a mistake to ignore internal
conditions in the hope of gaining a more conciliatory Russian foreign policy;
* The West should unequivocally condemn any Russian interference with
the sovereign rights of its one time Soviet republics (euphemistically
called "the near abroad"): the latter should not be treated as Russia's
legitimate sphere of influence but be given such assistance as they require
to secure effective independence from their one time imperial master; if
Russia manages to reincorporate in some fashion its former colonies, this
will surely whet its appetite for further encroachments along its frontier.
* The West has potent leverage in its financial resources and it should
not hesitate to withhold loans, investments and other economic benefits
if Moscow violates democratic standards at home or behaves aggressively
abroad;
* At the same time, the West should take into consideration Russia's
national sensitivities and abstain from actions in and near Russia which
bring home its impotence, such as expanding NATO to the Baltic republics
or engaging in military exercises near its borders. The more reasons the
Russians have to feel powerless, the stronger the impetus to sacrifice
everything to regain the status of a Great Power with all that this implies.
MILITARY/ SECURITY PANEL
Cornerstone Paper
Keith Payne
President and founding research director at the National
Institute for Public Policy and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University
and Southwest Missouri State University; editor in chief of Comparative
Strategy: An International Journal
Russian security policy has been formulated to support Russia's perceived
need to deter and confront the status quo power, i.e., the United States.
Nuclear weapons are increasingly accepted in Moscow as the only guarantee
of Russian national security and as the foundation of Russian military
strategy. The Russian Federation reportedly still possesses about 4,500
accountable strategic nuclear weapons and about 1,000 operational long-range
ballistic missiles. Less certain is the number of tactical nuclear warheads
in Russia's arsenal, with estimates beginning at six thousand warheads
and quickly rising to tens of thousands. Unclassified U.S. intelligence
estimates suggest that in the coming decade, Russia will be hard pressed
to maintain an arsenal of 1,500 strategic warheads. Informed Russian sources
echo that analysis, some suggesting that Russia may only have a force of
several hundred strategic systems at its disposal.
Despite the fact that Russia's ability to maintain a strategic nuclear
force clearly is eroding, Russia has nevertheless increasingly focused
its post-Cold War defense strategy around its status as a nuclear power.
In 1997, Russia rejected its earlier "no first use" pledge, and in a draft
Security Concept stated that Russia would use whatever means were at its
disposal, including nuclear weapons, if the survival of the Russian state
were threatened by aggression.
The Security Concept approved by Acting-President Putin in February
2000 is similar to the 1997 draft. It appears, however, to lower the threshold
for nuclear use. Where the 1997 draft referred to the survival of the Russian
state as the stakes making nuclear use acceptable, the 2000 Security Concept
refers to a broader threat category of "armed aggression" as justifying
nuclear use. It also explicitly identifies the U.S.-led West as a threat
to Russia's security, a new development in a document that otherwise focuses
on internal threats like domestic instability, organized crime and corruption.
Russian officials have denied that this amounts to a liberalization
of the circumstances under which nuclear weapons might be used. However,
Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, the head of Russia's Strategic Missile Troops
has said, "Russia is compelled to reduce the threshold for the use of nuclear
weapons
and to extend nuclear deterrence to conflicts of lesser scales and
to openly warn about that."
Russia's approach to military spending has confirmed this priority for
nuclear weapons. Funding for Russia's strategic nuclear forces has been
"fenced off' by the lower house of Russia's parliament and a classified
minimum funding criterion established. Until the most recent budget, Russia's
only fully funded military acquisition program has been the new TOPOL M
ICBM that has been entering the service at a relatively slow pace of ten
missiles per year. Other spending on strategic systems includes a new ballistic
missile submarine and SLBM, as well as improvements to Russia's nuclear
command-and-control systems.
Although Russian nuclear forces are facing an austere budget climate,
their relative health when compared to Russia's conventional forces is
clear. In terms of conventional forces, Russia's army has scaled back to
approximately 1.2 million men, of which perhaps as few as 200,000 could
be considered operational. The Russian Defense Ministry has reportedly
concluded that "the average Russian soldier is only marginally combat capable."
There may in fact be no full-strength units at the divisional level. According
to Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, 30 percent of Russian weapons are not
combat-ready and 70 percent of the Navy's ships are in need of repair.
As a consequence of these deficiencies, Russia has only limited capabilities
to project conventional military power beyond its borders.
In the context of the current Chechen conflict, the Russian General
Staff's response to this state of readiness is to only move troops forward
after an area has been thoroughly destroyed by artillery, air and missile
strikes. Russian military leadership has clearly improved between the 1994-1996
war and the present conflict, and morale is likely also improved over the
first war where young conscripts often were not even told they were heading
into a combat situation. However, despite Russia's "success" in prosecuting
the current war, the state of her conventional forces remains poor.
It appears that Russia hopes to rely on its nuclear shield during the
longer and more expensive process of building up a modem conventional military
capability. While this strategy has limits (e.g., Chechnya), its economic
advantages are clear. The current Russian budget, if carried out, represents
not only an overall increase in spending, but conventional as well as nuclear
force acquisition monies. In addition, strategic nuclear capability is
the only claim Russia has to its former status. In the words of retired
paratroop General Alexander Lebed, a former head of the Security Council,
"the only thing for which Russia is respected in the world and which makes
us worthy partners ... is our strategic rocket forces." Indeed, President
Yeltsin's remarks about a potential "world war" and the retargeting of
nuclear weapons at NATO countries in response to NATO bombing of Serbia
are evidence that Russia recognizes its dependence on nuclear weapons to
get the West to pay attention. From this Russian perspective, only nuclear
weapons offer Russia influence on a global scale. Reestablishing such influence
on a global scale is precisely the objective of this non-status quo power,
and numerous senior Russian civilian and military leaders openly advocate
a major expansion of Russia's strategic nuclear capabilities, including
the equipping of new land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads.
How this Russian dynamic may play out in coming years must, of course,
be speculative. But the recent past offers some plausible suggestions.
We may expect limited, but slowly growing Russian challenges. Unable to
compete with the United States directly, Russia is likely to challenge
Western policies and actions indirectly, and by using proxies, particularly
in regions on the periphery of NATO's likely areas of operation.
In a future acute regional crisis, for example, Russia may challenge
Western actions more resolutely than it has in Kosovo, including the delivery
of military aid that could make Western air operations more difficult (e.g.
the S-300 air and missile defense systems). In an escalating regional conflict
in which Russia has staked out a stridently anti-Western position, Russia
may resort to thinly-veiled nuclear saber rattling. There already are some
recent precedents for such Russian behavior, in addition to the unfortunate
example for the Russian leadership of explicit Chinese nuclear threats
to Washington over the issue of Taiwanese independence. Informed Russia
analysts have even suggested that in extreme cases, such as the deployment
of nuclear weapons to the new NATO countries, Russia would promote the
transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WNM) to regional "rogues" in support
of their challenges to the West.
How should the United States respond if Russia continues in this trend
toward an authoritarian, militarized, non-status quo power that identifies
the U.S. as the enemy? The United States should, of course, assist Russia
when possible should it choose to discard authoritarian controls on its
society and economy. Russian movement toward a market-oriented democracy
should be abetted whenever practicable.
However, the United States must no longer make policy based on the assumption
that concessions to an authoritarian Kremlin now will preserve some seed
of democracy for the future. Concessions now may well have the perverse
effect of confirming for many in Moscow the wisdom of their course toward
authoritarian rule, expansionism, and remilitarization.
If current trends hold, U.S. strategy should seek to contain renewed
Russian expansionism. With nationalism and anti-Western sentiment as their
political instruments, successful territorial expansion could serve only
to enhance the legitimacy of Russia's nationalists. Similarly, Washington
should cease pandering to Moscow in the area of strategic arms. There is
no apparent reason for Washington to continue to pace the size of its strategic
forces with the erosion of Russia's forces. The concept of "parity" as
a goal for U.S. strategic forces is a vestige of the Cold War and lacks
logical integrity.
The United States also should be prepared for Russia to pursue "asymmetric"
or indirect challenges to U.S. influence. And, of course, reliance on nuclear
threat is the most obvious "asymmetric" response to U.S. conventional preeminence.
Given Russia's current economic weakness and inability to confront U.S.
global power directly, Russia may also use manpower (e.g., technical expertise
or training cadres), technology transfer, and diplomatic assets to complicate
the U.S. strategic environment. The "strategic partnership" with China
clearly reflects these components. Moreover, the China partnership demonstrates
that Moscow is willing to run long-term risks (transferring technology
to a formidable future competitor) for the sake of near-term gains. If
emerging trends continue, Russia may be more risk tolerant than was the
Soviet Union.
Despite extreme social and economic disruptions, Russia has the human
and industrial potential to pose a serious mid-to-long term threat to the
United States. Russia's return to authoritarianism and militarism would
undoubtedly exploit that potential. Washington's discounting of this very
plausible and serious future threat carries the seeds of equally plausible
and serious regrets down the road. In fairness, there is the possibility
that the traditionally resilient Russian people may stiff retain an interest
in democratic freedoms that could ultimately survive current trends. However,
at present, developments in Russia seems to point more in the opposite
direction-- that Russia will move increasingly toward authoritarianism
and confrontation with the U.S. The analogy to the Weimar Republic of the
late 1920s and early 30s can easily be overdrawn, but there are some strikingly
similar elements at play in Russia. For the sake of both countries, Washington
should recognize this trend and cease all behavior that panders to and
rewards this dangerous direction in Russian development.
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